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I. INTRODUCTION

The use of tax-exempt financing to generate capital has
become an increasingly important aspect of corporate finance.1
The major appeal of this type of financing is reduced interest
cost.' Because income to the holder of tax-exempt obligations is
exempt from federal income taxation,3 tax-exempt financing
I See, e.g., Pell & Davidson, The Importance of Industrial Development
Bonds to Small Business, 2 MUN. FIN. J. 243 (1981). Companies Flock to TaxExempts, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 8, 1979, at 102.
Although lower interest rates are the major appeal of tax-exempt financing, there are other key advantages. Such financing is also frequently exempt
from state and local income taxation. Additionally, in contrast to most corporate
securities offerings that require extensive measures to satisfy the registration requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") under the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976), § 3(a)(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (1977)) provides that certain
tax-exempt bonds issued on behalf of companies are exempt from SEC registration. They are also exempt in many instances from state registration requirements under specific state "blue sky" laws. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §
97-108(a) (1981); W. VA. CoDE § 32-4-402(a)(1) (1982 Repl. Vol.). These benefits are
currently available without the loss of other tax advantages, such as the investment tax credit, I.R.C. § 38 (1976), and accelerated depreciation, I.R.C. § 167
(1976). The energy tax credit I.R.C. § 38 (Supp. 1111979), however, is reduced from
10% to 5% if the equipment qualifying for the energy tax credit is financed with
tax-exempt bonds. I.R.C. § 46 (1981).
I.R.C. § 103(a) (1976) provides that interest Income on the obligations of a
state, territory or possession of the United States, or any political subdivision
thereof, is exempt from federal income taxation. Since April 30, 1968, however,
I.R.C. § 103(b) (1976) has governed the tax exemption on "industrial development
bonds." In general, industrial development bonds are obligations issued for
private industrial and commercial development. The term "industrial development bond" is defined at I.R.C. § 103(b)(2):
(2) Industrial devel6pment bond.-For purposes of this subsection, the
term "industrial development bond" means any obligation(A) which is issued as part of an issue all or a major portion of
the proceeds of which are to be used directly or indirectly in any
trade or business carried on by any person who is not an exempt
person (within the meaning of paragraph (3)), and
(B) the payment of the principal or interest on which (under
the terms of such obligation or any underlying arrangement) is,
in whole or in major part(i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used
in a trade or business or in payments in respect of such
property, or
(ii) to be derived from payments in respect of property,
or borrowed money, used or to be used in a trade or
business.
An "exempt person" is defined in I.R.C. § 103(b)(3) to include a government unit.
I.R.C. § 103(b) further provides that interest on an industrial development
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typically bears a rate of interest significantly below the rate of
interest payable on otherwise comparable corporate debt instruments.' Debt instruments used to provide tax-exempt monies for the benefit of private corporations are a form of municipal bond' commonly referred to as industrial development
bond will qualify for federal tax-exempt status only if substantially all of proceeds
are to be used for certain exempt facilities, see I.R.C. §§ 103(b}(4-(5) (1981), or if
the size of the IDB issue is less than $1,000,000. I.R.C. § 103(b}(6)(A) (1980). Under
certain conditions, the $1,000,000 limit can be raised to $10,000,000 by an election
of the bond issuer. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6(D) (1981). When the election is inade, not only
is the face amount of the bond issue included in the $10,000,000, but certain
capital expenditures by the company using bond proceeds during a period beginning
3 years prior to and ending 3 years after the date of issuance will also count
toward the $10,000,000 limit. I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(6)(E-(F). For an analysis of the
federal tax exemption as it pertains to the $1,000,000 limitation on industrial
development bonds, see Cook & Safranek, Related Persons,Partnershipsand the
$10 Million Small Issue Exemption, 2 MuN. FiN. J. 253 (1981); Wade, Industrial
Development Bonds-The Capital Expenditure Rule for $10,000,000 Small
Issues, 34 Bus. LAW. 1771 (1979); Podolin & O'Leary, CapitalExpenditure Problems under the Ten Million DollarExemptionfor IndustrialDevelopment Bonds,
33 TAX LAW. 153 (1979).
1 Industrial development bonds will normally bear a rate of interest ranging
from 2 to 3.5 percentage points (200 to 350 basis points) below the rate of interest
payable on otherwise comparable corporate debt instruments.
I There are at least two broad classifications of municipal bonds-general
obligation bonds and revenue bonds. General obligation bonds are obligations
backed by the full faith and credit (ie., taxing power) of the entity that is the
issuer of the bonds. In other words, the issuing governmental entity has the
power to levy additional taxes to pay principal and interest due on general obligation bonds. General obligations bonds often require voter approval prior to their
issuance. See, e.g., Allison v. Phoenix, 44 Ariz. 66, 33 P.2d 927 (1934); Davis v.
Pueblo, 158 Colo. 319, 406 P.2d 671 (1965); Tracy v. Barnes County, 69 N.D. 602,
289 N.W. 377 (1939); Phillips v. City of Rock Hill, 188 S.C. 140, 198 S.E. 604 (1938).
Revenue bonds, on the other hand, generally are not considered to constitute
a liability of the issuer because they are not secured by the credit of the issuer.
See, e.g., State v. City of Tampa, 138 Fla. 840, 183 So. 491 (1938); Button v. Day,
203 Va. 687, 130 S.E.2d 459 (1963). Instead, revenue bonds are payable only from a
special fund, such as the revenues of the particular project or facility that is being
financed by the bond proceeds. See, e.g., Perl-Mack Civic Assoc. v. Board of
Directors, 140 Colo. 371, 344 P.2d 685 (1959). Hence, revenue bonds as a general
rule do not require voter approval as a condition to their issuance. See, e.g.,
Clover Leaf, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 145 Fla. 341, 199 So. 923 (1940; See also
Davis v. Pueblo, 158 Colo. 319, 406 P.2d 671 (1965). Revenue bonds traditionally
have been issued to finance such public revenue generating projects as sewer
systems, gas service, parking facilities, ports, rapid transit systems, toll roads,
bridges, stadiums, and solid waste disposal systems. In recent years revenue
bonds have been issued to finance local public housing projects.
Industrial development bonds (IDBs) are a species of municipal revenue
bonds. Like other forms of municipal revenue bonds, IDBs do not constitute an

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
[Vol. 84

576

bonds,' and will be referred to in this article as "IDBs."7
In view of current economic conditions, particularly
escalating interest costs and limited availability of traditional
sources of capital, tax-exempt financing through the issuance of
IDBs has increasingly been utilized in the private sector 8 as a
obligation of the public authority issuing them. Rather than being secured by the
revenues of a publicly owned project, however, they are secured solely by the
credit of the corporation that will use the IDB proceeds. Legislation governing
the issuance and uses of municipal revenue bonds for public projects generally
differs significantly from that governing IDBs, particularly in that the former has
no provision for the use of the facilities constructed by private corporations with
bond proceeds. Compare GA. CODE ANN. §§ 87-801 to -826 (1979) (governing
municipal revenue bonds for public projects) with GA. CODE ANN. §§ 69-1501 to
1510 (1979) (governing IDBs); Compare W. VA. CODE §§ 8-16-1 to -28 (1976 Repl.
Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1981) with W. VA. CODE §§ 13-2C-1 to -20 (1976 Repl. Vol. &
Cum. Supp. 1981).
For a discussion of all aspects of municipal bond financing, see R. LAMB & S.
RAPPORT, MUNICIPAL BONDS (1980) (in which the authors describe the IDBs as
"corporate bonds disguised to look like municipal bonds").
0 Although there may be an historical basis for the distinction,
in common
parlance the terms "industrial development bonds" and "industrial revenue
bonds" are used interchangeably and have the same meaning. See CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS 1 n.1 (April 1981).
' IDBs had their genesis in the State of Mississippi. In 1936, an industrial
development program in that state, entitled "Balance Agriculture with Industry,"
authorized the first IDB issue in the United States. For a detailed discussion of
the original Mississippi legislation, see Abbey, MunicipalIndustrialDevelopment
Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REV. 25, 27-28 (1965). Other states, particularly in the
Southeast, developed similar programs, the main intent of which was to
strengthen and stimulate the sagging economy of these primarily agricultural
states by attracting industry away from the northeastern United States. See
Note, Municipal Subsidies and the Industrializationof the South, 47 YALE L. J.
1412 (1938). By 1960, 16 other states had followed Mississippi's lead and had
enacted legislation permitting the issuance of IDBs. At least 40 states had
enacted such legislation by 1968. See Mitchell v. North Carolina Indus. Dev. Fin.
Auth., 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968). Today IDBs are permissible in some
form in all but 3 states-Washington, Idaho and Hawaii. (Idaho and Hawaii permit the issuance of IDBs to finance pollution control facilities, although Idaho requires voter approval.)
For a thorough discussion of the background and development of IDBs, see
Falk, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Industrial Development Financing,
22 VAND. L. REV. 159 (1968).
1 As the following table illustrates, the volume of IDBs has increased steadily
during the past decade:
Volume of Industrial Development Bonds*
Year
1971 ....................................
1972 ....................................

Amount
$ 219,510,000
470,695,000
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means of generating capital to acquire and construct a new facility, renovate or expand an existing facility or purchase
machinery and equipment for use by a private entity in its business.9 With the increased use of IDB financing has come an in1973 ....................................
1974 ....................................

269,762,000
339,970,000

1975 ....................................

517,801,000

1976 ....................................

356,909,000

1977 ....................................

463,816,000

1978 ....................................
1979 ....................................
1980 ....................................

586,076,000
1,339,890,000
1,485,731,000

*Does not include IDBs issued to finance pollution control facilities.
See 19 THE BOND BUYER'S MUNICIPAL FINANCE STATISTICS (1981).
9 I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(A)(1981) and the Treasury Regulations promulgated
thereunder provide that IDB proceeds can only be expended for the acquisition,
construction, reconstruction, or improvement of land or property qualifying for
the allowance for depreciation, or for payment of amounts which are for federal
income tax purposes chargeable to the project's capital account or which would be
so chargeable either with a proper election (for example, under I.R.C. § 266) or
but for a proper election to deduct such amounts).
State law governs the nature of the project that can be financed. As initially
conceived, IDBs were to be used solely for industrial projects. See Note,
Municipal Subsidies and the Industrializationof the South, 47 YALE L. J. 1412
(1938); Note Incentives to IndustrialRelocation: The Municipal IndustrialBond
Plans, 66 HARv. L. REV. 898 (1953). A growing number of states, however, have
enacted or amended legislation to permit the financing of commercial facilities
with IDBs. The Congressional Budget Office reported that as of 1980 IDBs were
available for commercial projects in 26 states. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS (April 1981). Various state courts
have specifically upheld the use of IDBs to finance commercial projects. See, e.g.,
Jordon v. Industrial Dev. Auth., Inc., 570 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1978); Grossman v.
Herkimer County Indus. Dev. Agency, 60 A.D.2d 172, 400 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977); Small World, Inc. v. Industrial Dev. Bd. of Tullahoma, 553 S.W.2d
596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); State ex rel. Ohio County Comm'n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d
2 (W. Va. 1980); See also White, Revenue Bonds for Commercial Development in
West Virginia, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 67 (1980).
The expanding use of IDBs, particularly for development of commercial projects, together with allegations of abuse, have generated considerable controversy
at both the state and federal level. For a discussion of both sides of the issue, see
Smith, Are More FederalLimits on IndustrialRevenue Bonds the Right Way to
Go?, 2 MUN. FIN. J. 56 (1981); Richardson, A Defense of Small Issue Industrial
Development Bonds, 2 MUN. FIN. J. 90 (1981); IndustrialDevelopment Bonds: A
ProposalforReform, 65 MINN. L. REV. 961 (1981); Economic and FederalRevenue
Effects of Changes in the Small IndustrialDevelopment Bond Provisions:Hearings Before Congressional Committee on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 517 (1980)
(Statement of N. Ture); The Controversy Over Industrial Revenue Bonds Heats
Up Again, DuN's REV., Sept. 1980, at 70; Greene, No Free Lunch, FORBES, Aug. 4,
1980, at 69; Hertzberg, On the Bondwagon: Use of Tax-Exempt Financingfor
Stores and Other Business Soars, Stirring Critics, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1980 at 56,
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creased concern by investors, as well as by bond rating agencies
called upon to assess the risk to investors, of the consequences
of the bankruptcy of the issuer or the company for whose
benefit the IDBs are issued."0 In particular, questions are being
raised concerning the risk that pre-bankruptcy payments to the
holders of IDBs might be recoverable from them as voidable
preferences under the federal bankruptcy laws.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978" was passed by the
Congress on October 6, 1978, and signed into law by President
Carter on November 6, 1978.12 Title I of the Reform Act, which
consists only of Section 101, enacts the substantive law of bankruptcy and codifies that law as Title 11 of the United States
Code (hereinafter the "Code"). Section 547 of the Code sets forth
the law relating to pre-bankruptcy transfers of a debtor's property that may be set aside in bankruptcy and recovered as preferences from the transferee creditors."3 The Code generally apcol. 1; Samuelson, IndustrialRevenue Bonds -Economic Boon or Public Ripoff?,
Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1980, at 1749; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SMALL ISSUE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS (April 1981).

The Oversight Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee held
hearings on IDBs during the Spring of 1981. See "Small Issue" Industrial
Development Bonds: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the
Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). On January 27, 1982,
the Reagan Administration unveiled its proposal to curb the use of IDBs. For a
summary of the provisions of that proposal see Gleckman. IDB Curbs Bared,
Minimum Tax Seen on Bond Interest, The Bond Buyer, Jan. 28, 1982, at 1. It is
anticipated that some change in the federal legislation granting tax-exempt status
to IDBs will occur during the current session of Congress.
0 The concern perhaps arises from the alarming increase in the incidence of
bankruptcies. In the first 10 months of 1981, for example, approximately 14,500
businesses filed for bankruptcy, which represented a gain of better than 42%
over 1980 filings. See New York Times, Nov. 15, 1981. The rate now exceeds 50
filings per 10,000 active businesses, which surpasses the rate of the 1970 and 1974
recessionary periods. Id. Bankruptcy filings in the automotive industry alone
have risen by 96%, and consumer bankruptcies have dramatically increased from
fewer than 180,000 filings in 1978 to a record 450,000 in fiscal 1981. Id. See also
WASH. FIN. REP. (BNA) No. 44, at A-10 (Nov. 9, 1981).
I' The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 1979)).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act constitutes the fifth bankruptcy law of the
United States and represents the first major revision of the federal laws relating
to bankruptcy since the enactment of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 883 (1938). The
Act was promulgated under Congress' power to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
1111 U.S.C. § 547 (Supp. III 1979).
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plies to all bankruptcy cases filed on or after October 1, 1979,'"
which is the date on which the former Bankruptcy Act 5 was
repealed. Accordingly, even though an IDB financing was concluded prior to this effective date, payments to the holders of
the IDBs will be subject to the preference provisions of section
547 in a bankruptcy case commenced on or after October 1, 1979.
This article will first discuss the typical structure of an IDB
financing and the participants in such a financing. Thereafter,
the article will analyze the potential for preference recovery
from investors in IDBs and like concerns of other participants in
the financing. Finally, the article will identify some recent innovations designed to insulate IDB investors from section 547
recovery and will assess the efficacy of these innovations. '6
II.

A.

STRUCTURE OF AN IDB FINANCING

Participants in an IDB Financing

The participants in a typical IDB transaction include the
issuer of the bonds (hereinafter the "issuer"); the private, forprofit entity that will ultimately be the beneficiary of the bond
proceeds (hereinafter the "company"); the purchasers of the
IDBs (hereinafter the "bondholders"); and an institutional
fiduciary to serve as bond trustee (hereinafter the "bond
trustee")."
" The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title IV, 92 Stat.
2549, 2682 § 402(a) (1978).
,1Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, cb. 541, 80 Stat. 544 (1898) (current revision at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. III 1979).
" This article is concerned with voidable preferences under § 547 of the
Code. It does not examine the trustee's avoidance powers under § 544 ("strong
arm" powers), § 548 (fraudulent conveyances), § 549 (invalid post-petition
transfer), or § 553 (limitation on the right to set-off mutual debts).
7 Depending on the complexity of the financing, various other participants
may also be involved, including investment bankers, feasibility consultants, and
accountants. In addition, bond counsel, generally a firm of attorneys with nationally recognized expertise in the area of municipal bond law, will be employed to
opine that the IDBs have been legally issued and that interest on the IDBs will be
exempt from federal income tax and, where applicable, from state income tax. An
opinion of bond counsel is routinely required by the underwriter or other purchaser of IDBs. Bond counsel has responsibility for the preparation of the legal
documents relating to the issuance of the IDBs. For a discussion on the role of
bond counsel, see Skees, Role of Bond Counsel: The Need for Definition, 1 MuN.
FIN. J. 199 (1980).
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1. Issuer. In order for interest on IDBs to be tax-exempt,
the issuer must qualify under federal law as an entity whose
debt obligations are exempt from federal taxation.18 Although it
is not uncommon for cities or counties, or even states, to act as
issuers, perhaps the most typical issuers are industrial development authorities. These authorities are public entities created
by state law. They are empowered to issue debt obligations in
order to accomplish some public purpose, such as the stimulation of economic development and the promotion of employment
opportunities within their respective jurisdictions.19
IDBs are typically nonrecourse debt obligations of the
issuer. Under the laws of most states, the issuer is obligated to
repay IDBs solely from the revenues it derives from the company in connection with the facility being financed. Except to
the extent of making those revenues available to the bondholders, the issuer has no pecuniary liability whatsoever, and
therefore, the IDBs are without recourse to the issuer 0 In a
I.R.C. § 103 (1976). See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Despite repeated constitutional challenges, legislation authorizing the
creation of industrial development authorities and the issuance by them of IDBs
has been upheld on the grounds that IDBs fulfill an essential public purpose.
State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak, 34 Wis. 2d 57, 148 N.W. 2d 683 (1967) (collecting
cases upholding 1DB legislation). See Hackler v. Baker, 233 Ark. 690, 346 S.W.2d
677 (1961); Andres v. First. Ark. Dev. Fin. Corp., 2309 Ark. 594, 324 S.W.2d 97
(1959); Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169 A.2d 634 (1961); Opinion of the
Justices, 103 N.H. 325, 171 A.2d 429 (1961); Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 438
P.2d 725 (Or. 1968); McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12
(1958); Darnell v. County of Montgomery 202 Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d 373 (1957); Almond v. Day, 197 Va. 782, 91 S.E.2d 660 (1956); State ex rel County Court v.
Kemp, 151 W. Va. 349, 151 S.E.2d 680 (1966); State ex rel County Court v. Bane,
148 W. Va. 392, 135 S.E.2d 349 (1964). See also Mulcahy & Guszkowski, The
Financingof CorporateExpansion Through IndustrialRevenue Bonds, 57 MARQ.
L. REV. 201 (1974); Pinsky, State ConstitutionalLimitations on Public Industrial
Financing:An Historicaland Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963);
Note, The 'PublicPurpose" of Municipal Financingfor Industrial Development,
70 YALE L.J. 789 (1961).
' State laws permitting the issuance of IDBs require in substance that IDBs
cannot be deemed to constitute a debt, liability, or obligation, or a pledge of the
faith and credit of the issuer, the state in which the issuer exists, or any political
subdivision of that state. The bonds may be payable only from the revenues and
other amounts derived by the issuer under the financing agreement and other
security specifically pledged for the payment of the IDBs; see infra note 29 and
accompanying text. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 13-2C-7 to -8 (1974 Repl. Vol.). The
holder of an IDB cannot look to or compel the exercise of the taxing power of the
"
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typical IDB financing, the issuer is merely a conduit and assigns
all of its rights and interests created by the documents executed
in connection with the issuance of the IDBs to the bond trustee
for the benefit of the bondholders.21 After the issuance and sale
of the IDBs, the issuer's role is generally passive. The primary
significance of the issuer in an IDB financing, therefore, is that
interest income to the bondholders on IDBs issued by it is exempt from federal taxation, whereas interest income to holders
of bonds issued directly by the company would be subject to taxation.
2. Company. The proceeds from the sale of the IDBs are
used to acquire, construct, renovate or improve certain real or
personal property (hereinafter the "project"). The company dictates the requirements, plans and specifications of the project,
often without input from or supervision by any of the other
participants in the financing.' The company agrees with the
issuer to pay amounts sufficient to satisfy, when due, the principal amount of and interest accruing on the IDBs, and to pay
the contractual fees and expenses of the issuer and the bond
trustee.'
3. Bond Trustee. As previously mentioned, the issuer in an
IDB financing will generally assign all of its rights and interests
in the financing to the bond trustee for the benefit of the bondholders. The bond trustee, therefore, collects the amounts due
from the company and administers the remittance of those
amounts to the bondholders as payments of principal and interest. The bond trustee is charged with the responsibility to enforce the legal and equitable remedies available to it in the
event of a default by the company.24 In effect, the bond trustee
issuer, the state, or any political subdivison of the state, for payment of the IDBs.
Several state statutes require that specific language regarding the nonrecourse
nature of the debt be printed verbatim on the form of bond.
2' The assignment is usually made in the "indenture of trust." See infra note

30 and accompanying text.
I In financings where the bondholders are sophisticated investors and
limited in number, the documentation may provide that the plans and specifications are subject to their approval. In some cases the approval of an independent
architect or engineer is required before any IDB proceeds can be applied to pay
the costs of acquisition and construction of the project.
I See infra note 29.
2'

The responsibilities of the bond trustee are set forth in a document that is

referred to as the "indenture of trust:' See infra note 30, and accompanying text.
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steps into the shoes of the issuer in an IDB financing, and is empowered as assignee of the issuer's rights to enforce payment
and collection from the company for the bondholders' benefit.
4. Bondholders. IDBs are traditionally marketed in one of
three ways: publicly, privately or in a limited institutional offering. Purchasers of IDBs normally include casualty and life insurance companies, commercial banks, certain savings and loans,
bond funds and individuals.' Purchasers have their own investment requirements and preferences and each varies in the
degree of sophistication and expertise brought to the process of
investing in corporate debt obligations.
Although the interest yield on tax-exempt securities is
lower in absolute terms than that on corporate bonds, it is usually higher on a net after-tax basis because of the exemption from
federal, and often state and local, income tax. Thus, investors in
most tax brackets may receive greater return from tax-exempt
investments, including IDBs, than on an after-tax basis from
other comparable investments.2 6
B. Basic Documentation in a Typical IDB Financing
1. Financing Agreement. Although they may take many
forms, IDB financings have traditionally been structured either
as a lease or as a sale." The issuer and the company enter into a
" In 1980, commercial banks became the mainstay of the municipal bond
market. Banks acquired $9.9 billion of new municipal issues in 1980, including a
substantial number of IDBs. Casualty insurance companies, formerly the principal
buyers, accounted for some $8 billion of purchases. See The Daily Bond Buyer,
Oct. 14, 1980 at 1. The Federal Reserve Board reported, however, that individuals
bought three-quarters of the new issues of tax-exempt securities during the first
9 months of 1981, taking the lead from commercial banks. See The Daily Bond
Buyer, Dec. 15, 1981 at 1. Experts predict, however, that casualty insurance firms
may resume a significant role as investors in tax-exempt securities by late 1982.
See The Daily Bond Buyer, Jan. 7, 1982 at 1.
I For a married couple filing a joint return for 1981 with a combined income
of $24,600 to $29,900 (29% tax bracket), a 10% tax-exempt bond is equivalent,
after taxes, to a taxable return of 14.08%. The results are more dramatic as the
taxpayer's tax bracket increases. For example, if this same couple had a taxable
income in excess of $60,000 (49% tax bracket), an equivalent taxable issue would
have to yield 19.61%. See [1982] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)

278.10

= For a discussion of the lease agreement and other legal documentation
supporting an issue of IDBs, see Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development
Bonds, 19 VAND. L. REv. 25 (1965).
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lease agreement or an agreement of sale pursuant to which the
issuer agrees to use the IDB proceeds to acquire and construct
the project and to lease or sell the project to the company. The
issuer, in turn, grants to the company full power and authority
to acquire and construct the project in accordance with the company's requirements and specifications. When a lease agreement
is used, the company is obligated, upon termination of the lease,
to purchase the facility for a nominal price.
Recent enabling legislation in many states permits the
issuer to lend the proceeds from the sale of the IDBs directly to
the company pursuant to a loan agreement.' When a loan is permissible, the pretense of having the issuer construct the facility
is unnecessary and at all times during the term of the financing
the facility is owned by the company. The lease agreement,
agreement of sale or loan agreement, as the case may be (hereinafter the "financing agreement"), requires the company to
make payments to the issuer in amounts necessary to pay debt
service on the IDBs together with any incidental fees and expenses of the issuer and trustee.2
Thirty-seven states now permit the structuring of an IDB financing as a
loan of the proceeds by the issuer to the company. The 13 states that prohibit
such a loan are Alabama, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota
and Virginia.
I Payment language in a representative financing agreement provides:
Section

-

Amounts Payable.

(a) The company hereby covenants and agrees to pay the purchase
price [make lease payments] [repay the loan] in installments, as follows:
on or before five (5) business days prior to any interest payment date
for the bonds, such being

and

-

of each year

commencing
, 198,
or any other date fixed for
redemption of any or all of the bonds pursuant to the indenture, until
the principal of, premium, if any, and interest on the bonds shall have
been fully paid or provision for the payment thereof shall have been
made in accordance with the indenture, in immediately available funds,
a sum which, together with other moneys available therefor, will enable
the bond trustee to pay the amount payable on such date as principal of
(whether at maturity or upon redemption or acceleration or otherwise),
premium, if any, and interest on the bonds as provided in the indenture.
(b) The company will also pay upon demand the reasonable expenses of the issuer related to the issuance of the bonds.
(c) The company will also pay the reasonable fees and expenses of
the bond trustee.
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2. Indenture of Trust. In addition to the financing agreement, the issuer will enter into an indenture of trust (hereinafter the "indenture") with the bond trustee. The indenture provides that all of the issuer's rights and interests in the financing
agreement, including the right to collect payments thereunder,
are assigned to the bond trustee. Moreover, the indenture will
set forth all of the terms and conditions of the IDBs, such as provisions concerning redemption, interest rate and maturity. It
will further specify the rights, duties, and remedies of the bond
trustee.0
C.

Security for Payment of the IDBs

IDBs are primarily secured by an assignment of the
revenues payable to the issuer by the company under the financing agreement. These payments under the financing agreement
are assigned by the issuer to the bond trustee pursuant to the
indenture and, in fact, are generally paid by the company directly to the bond trustee for remittance to the bondholders. 1 In addition to the pledge of revenues, two other security devices are
typically found in an IDB financing-a mortgage on the project
and a guaranty of payment from a third party.
1. Mortgage. IDBs are routinely secured by granting a
mortgage3 2 upon that portion of the project consisting of real
' The indenture normally will permit the bond trustee to exercise various
remedies against the company upon the occurrence of specified events of default
under the indenture or the financing agreement. If the default results from the
failure to make a required payment, the bond trustee is generally required to exercise its remedies. Remedies normally include the right to accelerate the indebtedness represented by the IDBs and to declare all outstanding principal and the
interest due thereon immediately due and payable.
S The company's recognition of the assignment by the issuer of the amounts
payable under the financing agreement, and the company's agreement to pay
such amounts directly to the bond trustee, may take the following form:
It is understood and agreed that all payments payable under this
section by the company are assigned by the issuer to the bond trustee
for the benefit of the bondholders. The company assents to such assignment. The issuer hereby directs and the company hereby agrees to pay
to the bond trustee ... all payments payable by the company pursuant
to this section.
' State law will dictate the form of lien that will be taken in the project. For
example, in Georgia, a "deed to secure debt" may be the vehicle preferred over a
mortgage, and in West Virginia the preferred vehicle may be a "deed of trust."
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property and by a security interest in that portion of the project
consisting of personal property. Depending on the specific structure of the financing, the mortgagor may be either the issuer or
the company and the mortgagee may be either the issuer or the
bond trustee. Where the mortgagor is the company and the mortgagee is the issuer, the rights and interests of the issuer in the
mortgage are assigned to the bond trustee in the same manner
as the issuer's rights and interests in the financing agreement
are assigned.
2. Guaranty. A second common method of enhancing the
security of IDBs is an unconditional guaranty of payment of the
IDBs or the financing agreement, or both, which is obtained
from a parent or affiliate of the company.' Although the specific
terms of a guaranty agreement will vary, the guarantor at a
minimum agrees to pay to the bond trustee for distribution to
the bondholders amounts necessary to satisfy the unpaid principal and interest due on the IDBs if the bond trustee has insufficient funds available to make those payments. The guarantor
ordinarily convenants to honor the guaranty without the requirement that the bond trustee first exhaust other available
remedies. As a result, the bondholders may look not only to the
credit of the company that will use the proceeds derived from
the sale of the IDBs, but also to the credit of a financially strong
parent or affiliate of the company.
I Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (current version at 15 U.S.C §§
77a-77bbbb (1976)) makes it unlawful for any person to offer or sell securities in
interstate commerce or through the mails, unless a registration statement has
been filed with the SEC and the purchaser/offeree has been provided with a prospectus meeting the requirements of § 10 of that Act. Section 3(a)(2) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (1977)) exempts "any security which is an industrial
development bond." See supra note 3. It is generally accepted, and the SEC has
issued "no action" letters to the effect that, this exemption not only extends to
the IDBs themselves, but also to the other integral parts of the exempted IDBs,
including underlying agreements such as a guaranty. See, e.g., Hopewell Convalescent Center [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81, 292;
McDonald's Corp. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 76, 336. In
certain cases, however, particularly where the guarantor under the guaranty is
not related to the company and is not a user of the project, the SEC has declined
to issue no-action letters with respect to the exemption of the guaranty from
registration, and has indicated that such a guaranty may be subject to registration requirements despite the exemption applicable to the IDBs themselves. See,
e.g., County of Yellowstone [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
80, 719.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY PREFERENCE PROBLEM
A.

Overview of Preferences

A principal goal of the preference provisions of the Code is
the assurance of equal distribution of the debtor's assets among
its creditors" and the prevention of favoritism. 5 As will be
discussed below, a preference that is voidable in bankruptcy consists of seven distinct elements. Each of these elements must be
shown to exist before the alleged preferential transfer may be set
aside.36
4 The drafters of the Code gave these reasons for the need for effective
preference provisions in the Code:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting
the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short
period before bankrupty, creditors are discouraged from racing to the
courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.
The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his
way out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of
his creditors. Second, and more important, the preference provisions
facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among
creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater payment
than others is required to disgorge so that all may share equally. The
operation of the preference section to deter "the race of diligence" of
creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the preference section-that of equality of distribution.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS. 5963, 6138.
1 See Zelman v. Esher (In re C. S. Mersick & Co.), 1 Bankr. 599 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1979).
It should be noted that, until the commencement of a bankruptcy case, a debtor
has the right to dispose of his property and to prefer one creditor over another
provided that the disposition is not otherwise violative of federal or state law.
Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, 237 F. 763 (8th Cir. 1916). As noted by the
court in Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841, 843-44 (E.D. Ill. 1940),
affd, 123 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1941):
A voidable preference under the Bankruptcy Act does not involve any
fraudulent intent. Indeed, in the absence of the bankruptcy law, a
diligent creditor may lawfully retain a preference ... But the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about equality of division of assets
among creditors. For the rule that to the diligent creditor belongs the
reward, the act substitutes the rule that equality is equity.
I See Ledford v. Fort Hamilton Hughes Memorial Hosp. Center (In re
Mobley), 15 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); McDaniel v. Waits (In re Nat.
Buy-Rite, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 407 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); Bahas v. Sagen (In re
Durkay), 9 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); Suppa v. Capalbo (rn re Suppa), 8
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The preference provisons of section 547 apply in liquidation
cases commenced under Chapter 7 of the Code, 37 in reorganization
cases commenced under Chapter 11 of the Code,38 and in municipal debt adjustment cases commenced under Chapter 9 of the
Code.3 9 In a Chapter 7 case, the duly appointed trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor's estate will be the party asserting preference claims."0 In Chapter 11 cases the debtor normally remains
in possession of his assets"' and is known as the debtor in possession. 2 He will be the party asserting the preference 3 unless a
trustee is appointed by the court for cause on the request of a
creditor or other interested party." In Chapter 9 cases, the
municipality has the proper standing to bring preference claims,
but a trustee may be appointed for that purpose at the request of
an interested party if the municipality declines to assert the
preference.' 3 For purposes of this article, the party asserting the
preference will be referred to as the "bankruptcy trustee" irrespective of the particular Chapter of the Code involved.
Section 547 of the Code sets forth the law of pre-bankruptcy
transfers that are voidable by the bankruptcy trustee as socalled "preferences." A preference is defined by subsection (b) of
section 547 of the Code to be:
Bankr. 720 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981); Weill v. Tennessee Cent. Credit Union (In re Kelly),
3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. III 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. II 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (Supp. III 1979).
40 A trustee is appointed as the representative of creditors of the debtor's
estate in a Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. III 1979).
4' 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (Supp. III 1979).
.2 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1) (Supp. III 1979).
11 Section 1107(a) of the Code vests the debtor in possession with all of the
rights and powers of a trustee in a Chapter 7 case, which would include the power
to avoid preferential transfers under § 547. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. III 1979).
See United Capital Corp. v. Sapolin Paints, Inc. (In re Sapolin Paints, Inc.), 11
Bankr. 930 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
In Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Monsour Medical Center (In re Monsour Medical Center), 5 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980), the court held that
when a debtor in possession unjustifiably fails to exercise its avoidance powers
under § 547, the creditors' committee has the implied authority to institute an
avoidance action on behalf of the debtor in possession. Contra Segarra v. Banco
Cent. Y. Economias (In re Segarra), 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 552 (Bankr. D. P.R.
1981).
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(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

a "transfer" 4 (as defined in section 101(40) of the
47
Code),
of property of the debtor, 8
to or for the benefit of a "creditor"'4 (as defined in
section 101(9) of the Code), 0
by
for or on account of an antecedent debt owed
1
the debtor before such transfer was made,
made while the debtor was "insolvent"52 (as defined
in section 101(26) of the Code), 3 the debtor being
presumed to have been insolvent during the 90-day

" 11
'5 11

U.S.C. § 1104(a) (Supp. II 1979).
U.S.C. § 926 (Supp. III 1979).
, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. III 1979).
'T Section 101(40) defines "transfer" to mean "every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing with property or
with an interest in proptery, including retention of title as a security interest."
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. 1I 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. m11979).
4911 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979); see Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d
1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (pre-Code case).
I Section 101(9) defines "creditor" to include an "entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (Supp. I1 1979).
5- 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979); see Ledford v. Fort Hamilton Hughes
Memorial Hosp. Center (In re Mobley), 15 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (payment on January 24 for health care services rendered on February 29 was not on
account of an antecedent debt).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (Supp. II 1979).
' Section 101(26) defines "insolvent" to mean a "financial condition such that
the sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property, at a
fair valuation," exclusive of certain property fraudulently conveyed by the entity
and certain property that individual debtors may exempt from the claims of their
creditors under § 522 of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A)(i), (ii) (Supp. III 1979). See
Clay v. Traders Bank (In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp.), 11 Bankr. 515 (Bankr. W. D.
Mo. 1981).
The phrase "at a fair valuation" also appeared in the definition of insolvency
contained in § 1(19) of the former Bankruptcy Act. The courts in pre-Code cases
construed this phrase to mean that an asset would be included in the debtor's
estate for purposes of computing insolvency only if the asset had "a value that
can be made promptly effective by the owner of property 'to pay his debts."'
Stern v. Paper, 183 F. 228, 230 (D.N.D. 1910), af'd, 198 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1912). If
the value of an asset is not susceptible of prompt realization, as is often the case
with choses in action of a debtor, the courts have declined to attribute a value to
such assets in determining whether insolvency exists. See, e.g., Penn v. Grant,
244 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1957) (action for usury against finance company); In re F&M
Corp., 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 292 (D. Kan. 1978) (breach of contract claims
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period before the bankruptcy case is commenced,
(6) on or within 90 days before the bankruptcy petition
is filed,55
(7) that enables such creditor to receive more than he
would be entitled to receive in a liquidation case
under Chapter 7 of the Code if the transfer had not
been made.w
If the creditor receiving the challenged transfer is found to
be an "insider" 7 of the debtor, then the 90-day period referred to
above is extended to include the period between 90 days and one
year before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.' If
the bankruptcy trustee seeks to avoid a transfer to an insider
during this extended period, he does not have the benefit of the
presumption that the debtor was insolvent during that period;
he must prove that the insider had reasonable cause to believe
at the time the transfer was made that the debtor was
insolvent." An "insider" is defined to include a person who has a
against federal government); In re Nelly Don, Inc., 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 681
(W.D. Mo. 1978) (net operating loss carry forward); In re Bichel Optical
Laboratories, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 545 (D. Minn. 1969) (antitrust claim).
11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. mI 1979).
The presumption is as defined in FED. R. EvID. 301. It requires the party
against whom it weighs to come forward with some evidence to rebut the
presumption. The burden of persuasion, however, remains on the party in whose
favor the presumption exists. McDaniel v. Waits (in re Nat'l Buy-Rite, Inc.), 7
Bankr. 407 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); Mazer v. Aetna Fin. Co. (in re Zuni), 6 Bankr.
449 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 375,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6331; S.REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5875.
5 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1m 1979). See In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980); Potson v. Bradford (In re Bradford), 5 Bankr. 18 (Bankr. D.
Nev.), affd, 6 Bankr. 741 (D. Nev. 1980).

11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(A)-(C) (Supp. I 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (Supp. I 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. 11 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) (Supp. I 1979); see Tarrant v. Sooner Truck &
Tractor, Inc. (in re Sooner Truck & Tractor, Inc.), 17 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Old.
1982); MeWilliams v. Gordon (In re Camp Rockhill, Inc.), 12 Bankr. 829 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1981).
Only reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent, and not actual
knowledge, is necessary to render the transfer voidable. Loftis v. Minar (In re
Montanino), 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d 362 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981). As was stated by
the court in In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 366 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1966), the determintion of whether a creditor had reasonable cause to believe his debtor was insolvent is a two-step process.
First, the court must determine what the creditor knew; then it must
apply the rules as to the legal consequences of what he knew. The first
5
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close relationship with the debtor, such as certain relatives,
partners, officers, directors, and those in control of the debtor."0
If each of the foregoing elements of a preference is
established, the bankruptcy trustee is entitled to invalidate the
transfer under Section 547(b).11 It should be emphasized that
each of-these elements must be shown to exist at the time of the
transfer, 2 except the seventh element relating to the effect of
the transfer, 3 which is determined after the bankruptcy case is
6
commenced.

An action by the bankruptcy trustee under Section 547 to
set aside a preferential transfer must be commenced before the
earlier of two years after his appointment 6 4 or the time the
bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed. 5 If a debtor in possession is serving in a case under Chapter 11 of the Code, it appears
that the two-year limitation period will not commence unless
and until a bankruptcy trustee is appointed. 6 Once the
step is indeed a question of fact. A typical illustration is resolving a conflict in testimony, as when a bankrupt insists that he told the creditor
he was being forced to close down and the creditor denies it; another is
determining the creditor's knowledge by a factual inference, as when a
bankrupt's poor financial condition has been bruited about in the trade,
the creditor denies having heard of it, but his conduct, e.g., in pressing
for more than usual security, suggests that he had.
Id at 587-88.
Once having established what the creditor knew, a determination must be
made whether the circumstances are such as would incite a man of ordinary
prudence to make inquiry so that he is chargeable with notice of all facts which a
diligent inquiry, not only of the debtor, but of others, would have disclosed. See
Green v. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 17 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 592 (8th Cir. 1978); In re
Hygrade Envelope Corp., 366 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1966); Shaw v. United States Rubber
Co., 361 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1966).
11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (Supp. III 1979). See generally Phillips, Insider Provisions of the New Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363 (1981).
, See supra note 36.
62 See, e.g., Moister v. Waters (In re Waters), Bankr. 163 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1981) (insolvency must be shown at time of transfer); Strickler v. Thomas (In re
Thomas), 7 Bankr. 389 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (insolvency must be shown at time
of transfer); McWilliams v. Gordon (In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., 12 Bankr. 829
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (insider relationship must be determined as of date of
transfer).
3 See infra notes 147-150, and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(2) (Supp. II 1979).
See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1546.02 at 546-6 (15th ed. 1981) [hereinafter
"COLLIER"].
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bankruptcy trustee avoids the preferential transfer under section 547, he is empowered by Section 550 of the Code to recover
the property itself, or, if the court so orders, the value of the
property. 7 Such recovery is available against both the initial
transferee of the debtor and the entity for whose benefit the
transfer was made," as well as against any subsequent
transferee of the property, 9 unless the subsequent transferee
took the property for value, in good faith and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided. 0 However,
the bankruptcy trustee is entitled only to a single satisfaction.7'
An action under section 550 is barred if it is not commenced
before the earlier of one year after the avoidance of the transfer
72
and the time the case is closed or dismissed.
B.

Preference Analysis in Company Bankruptcies

In the context of an IDB financing, the concern frequently is
expressed that payments received by the bondholders on account of the IDBs they hold may be subject to recovery as
preferences by the bankruptcy trustee if the company files for,
or is placed into,7 bankruptcy. Whether this concern is well7 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. III 1979).
" 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (Supp. I1 1979). Section 550(a), which specifies the
transferees from whom such recovery may be had, uses the disjunctive "or" when
specifying them. Section 102(5) of the Code, however, makes clear that the word
"or" is not exclusive. 11 U.S.C. § 102(5) (Supp. 1I 1979); See also 124 CONG. REC.
H11097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 129 CONG. REC. S17414 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
0111 U.S.C. §'550(a)(2) (Supp. 1I 1979).
10 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (Supp. III 1979).
" 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (Supp. 1I 1979).
' 11 U.S.C. § 550(e) (Supp. III 1979).
"Regardless of whether it is insolvent in a balance sheet sense, the company may be placed into either a Chapter 7 liquidation case or a Chapter 11
reorganization case if it is shown that the company is "generally not paying [its]
debts as such debts become due" or that within 120 days before the filing of the
petition a custodian (other than one appointed or authorized to take charge of less
than substantially all of its property to enforce a lien thereon) was appointed for
the company or took possession of its assets. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) & (h) (Supp. III
1979). The involuntary petition must be filed by at least three creditors of the
company who hold claims that are not contingent as to liability and that in the aggregate exceed by at least $5,000 the value of any security held by them. 11
U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (Supp. II 1979). If, however, the company has fewer than 12
creditors holding unsecured claims, a single qualified creditor whose unsecured
claim equals at least $5,000 may commence the involuntary case. 11 U.S.C. §
303(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
As will be seen later in the text, an issuer may not be placed involuntarily into bankruptcy. See infra notes 107-21 and accompanying text.
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founded will, of course, depend upon whether each of the
previously discussed elements of a preference is shown to exist.
Putting aside for a moment the first two of the seven essential elements, it is relevant at the outset to ascertain whether
the bondholders are "creditors" of the company so as to satisfy
the third requirement that the transfer be "to or for the benefit
of a creditor" of the debtor.74 Section 101(9) of the Code defines
"creditor" to include any "entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief
concerning the debtor."75 Since one cannot be a creditor unless
one holds a claim against the debtor, the Code's definition of a
"claim" must be consulted. A "claim" is defined by section 101(4)
of the Code to include a "right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured.

'7

6

In situations where a party's

only rights are against property of the debtor and not against
the debtor personally, as is the case in nonrecourse loan agreements, section 102(2) of the Code makes clear that such a claim
is nonetheless to be regarded as
against property of the debtor
7
a claim against the debtor.
7' 11
75 11

U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).

U.S.C. § 101(9) (Supp. III 1979).
" 11 U.S.C. '§ 101(4) (Supp. III 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 102(2) (Supp. III 1979). If the property of the debtor securing
the creditor's claim is worth less than the total amount of the claim, § 506(a) of the
Code provides that the creditor has two claims: he is deemed to be the holder of a
secured claim to the extent of the value of his collateral and the holder of an
unsecured claim to the extent of the deficiency. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1979).
The unsecured portion of a nonrecourse claim would not be enforceable against
the debtor in a Chapter 7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). In a Chapter
11 reorganization case, however, § 1111(b)(1)(A) of the Code overrides the effect of

§ 502(b)(1) with respect to the undersecured, nonrecourse claim and provides that
the unsecured portion of the claim is not unenforceable solely because it is
without recourse to the debtor. The principal purpose of § 1111(b)(1)(A) is to pre-

vent the undersecured, nonrecourse creditor from being deprived of his security
in the Chapter 11 case by the debtor's payment to him of its appraised value,
thereby leaving him with an unenforceable unsecured claim for the deficiency.
Although the affected creditor may elect treatment of his claim different from
that afforded by § 1111(b)(1)(A), a discussion of the circumstances making such different treatment advisable is beyond the scope of this article. For an insightful
discussion of the subject, see Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss3/3

20

Dobbs
Preference
Concerns in Industrial Development Bond Fin
1982] and Joslin: Bankruptcy
BANKRUPTCY
SYMPOSIUM
Applying the foregoing definitions to an IDB financing, it is
probable that, notwithstanding the nonrecourse provisions of
the typical IDB, the bondholders may be creditors of the issuer
in situations where the issuer retains title to the project and executes a mortgage on the project to secure the IDBs. The bondholders, in such situations, have a claim against property of the
issuer by virtue of the mortgage on the project to the bond
trustee. However, the IDBs, which are the debt obligations of
the issuer alone, themselves establish no debtor-creditor relationship between the company and the bondholders. Such a relationship between the company and the bondholders nevertheless does exist by virtue of the rights acquired through the
issuer's assignment of the financing agreement to the bond
trustee for the bondholders' benefit. 8 Furthermore, if the company rather than the issuer is the owner of the project, the bond
trustee as mortgagee of the project on behalf of the bondholders
would have a claim against property of the company to insure
payment of the IDBs. This claim against the project would
qualify the bondholders as creditors of the company within the
meaning of the Code.
Even though the bondholders are creditors of the company,
they do not receive directly from the company any transfer of
its property. Rather, the payments on their IDBs are received
derivatively from the bond trustee. The third element of a preference, it will be recalled, may be satisfied either by a transfer
directly from the debtor to the creditor or by a transfer to a
third party for the creditor's benefit." Hence, the fact that the
bondholders' receipt of payments from the company flows
through an intermediary, the bond trustee, for ultimate disbursement to them will not prevent the payments from constituting a preference.
The question next arises whether the payment to the bond
trustee for the bondholders' benefit constitutes a "transfer"
within the meaning of section 547. The Code's definition of
"transfer" is extremely broad. It includes "every mode, direct or
indirect, absolute or conditonal, voluntary or involuntary, of
"' See In re H.E. Page Motor Car Co., 251 F. 318 (D. Mass. 1918) (assignees of
claims are creditors of the debtor).
7911 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (Supp. 1I 1979); see In re Schleicher Printing Corp.) 62

F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1933).
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disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property."8 Based on this definition, it is readily apparent that the
company's payments to the bond trustee would be a parting
with property sufficient to create a transfer within the meaning
of the provison.81
Section 547, however, clarifies for preference purposes the
time when a transfer is deemed to have been made. It provides
that "a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights
in the property transferred."8 2 Once the debtor has acquired
such rights, the time when the transfer is deemed to have been
made will generally depend upon when it was perfected." If the
transfer is perfected within 10 days after it first took effect between the parties, then the transfer is "made" when it took effect. " If the transfer is perfected after the 10-day period, section
547 states that the transfer is not deemed to have been made until it is perfected." Moreover, if it is not perfected by the date of
bankruptcy, the transfer is deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy petition."
Since a determination of when a transfer is deelned to have
been made will hinge upon when it is perfected, the concept of
perfection is an important one. Section 547 provides that a
transfer of personal property is perfected when under applicable nonbankruptcy law a "creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the
11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. II 1979).
S

See, e.g., In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 137 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1943);

Schloss v. Powell, 93 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1938); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schafly, 299
F. 202 (8th Cir. 1924).
' 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. 1m 1979). See Cox v. General Elec. Credit Corp.
(In re Cox), 10 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981).
w 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (Supp. I 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979); see Seeley v. Church Bldg. & Interiors, Inc. (in re Church Bldg. Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla,
1981) (perfection of transfer occurred 87 days prior to bankruptcy, but by virtue
of relation back, transfer was deemed to have been made outside 90 day period);
Still v. Murfreesboro Prod. Credit Ass'n (in re Butler), 3 Bankr. 182 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1980).
' 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (Supp. mI 1979); see Seeley v. Church Bldg. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldg. & Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 74 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1981); Sid Kumines, Inc. v. Wolf (In re Wolf), 13 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
' 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (Supp. I1 1979); see Weill v. Tennessee Cent.
Credit Union (In re Kelly), 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
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transferee."87 If under applicable nonbankruptcy law a creditor
on a simple contract' of the company could not obtain a judicial
lien upon the funds in the bond trustee's possession that is
superior to the bond trustee's interest therein, then the company's remittance of those funds to the bond trustee would immediately effect a transfer for section 547 preference purposes.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze this
question under the applicable laws of each jurisdiction, it is
reasonable to conclude that such laws would rarely work to vest

a creditor with a judicial lien on the funds superior to the
fiduciary interests therein of the bond trustee." For the purpose
of this article, therefore, it will be assumed that applicable nonbankruptcy law would generally dictate a result favorable to the
', 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (Supp. HI 1979); see Still v. Murfreesboro Prod.
Credit Ass'n (Inre Butler), 3 Bankr. 182 (Bankr. E./D. Tenn 1980). A "judiciallien" as
used in § 547(e)(1)(B) means a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or
other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) (Supp. IH 1979).
It is not readily apparent from a reading of § 547(e)(1}(B) whether the
hypothetical creditor on a simple contract referred to is one who possesses a
judicial lien at the time of or subsequent to the transferr. The legislative history
indicates that the hypothetical creditor is one "that obtains a judicial lien after
the transfer is perfected." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 374,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6330 (emphasis added); S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. & AD. NEWS
5787, 5875 (emphasis added). While the intent of this legislative history is clear, as
written it uses circular language by stating, in effect, that a transfer of property
occurs when it is perfected, and that the transfer is perfected when a creditor
could not obtain a superior judicial lien on the property after the perfection of the
transfer. Nonetheless, a careful reading of § 547(e)(1)(B) leads to the conclusion
that the creditor referred to therein is one who, subsequent to the transfer, could
not obtain a judicial lien on the property that is superior to the interest of the
transferee.
" The term "simple contract" is derived from former § 60a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5875.
1 A judicial lien creditor in some jurisdictions may levy execution upon
money which is in the possession of the debtor or which is held by a third party
for the debtor's benefit and identifiable as his money. See, e.g., Kyne v. Kyne, 16
Cal. 2d 436, 106 P.2d 620 (1940); Harvey v. Wright, 80 Ga. App. 232, 55 S.E.2d 835
(Ga. Ct. App. 1949); Sullivan v. Tinker, 140 Pa. 135, 21 A. 247 (1898). However, if
the money is transferred by the debtor prior to the existence of the judicial lien
and the transfer is not otherwise voidable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,
then it is highly unlikely that the money in the hands of a third party under claim
of right could be levied upon by a subsequent judgment creditor of the debtor.
See 49 C.J.S. Judgments§ 485(a) (1947); 46 Am,. JuR. 2D Judgments§§ 245-89 (1969).
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bond trustee in a contest between it and a judgment creditor on
a simple contract of the company.
From the preceding discussion, it can be seen that the first
and third elements of a preference may exist in an IDB financing. The second element, which requires that the transfer consist of "property of the debtor," is readily met if the funds used
to make the payment to the bond trustee are, in fact, property
of the company. If the issuer retains ownership of the project
and if the funds used to make the payment consist solely of
revenues derived from the operation of the project, a question
may be raised as to whether the funds may rightly be considered to be property of the company. It is likely, however, that
the courts would find the company to have had an interest in the
revenues sufficient to qualify them as its property, rather than
as property the company is administering merely as the issuer's
agent. If, on the other hand, the company is the owner of the
project and, consequently, the revenues derived from it, payments to the bond trustee out of those revenues would constitute transfers of its property that would meet the second element of a preference.
The fourth element of a preference is that the transfer must
be "for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made." The term "antecedent debt"
does not mean that the debt must be past due." Rather, a debt is
antecedent to a transfer if it existed prior to the time that the
transfer was made. 1 In an IDB transaction, the indebtedness of
the company is evidenced by the financing agreement, which is
executed concurrently with the issuance and sale of the IDBs
and assigned by the issuer to the bond trustee. Even if that indebtedness is payable in installments, the payments on those installments as they mature nevertheless are made on account of
a debt which was previously incurred to the bondholders. It is

"oSee In re Haupt & Co., 424 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1970) (unbilled fees); In re
Aska Structures, Inc., 20 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 221 (D. Ore. 1979) (deferred payment of back salary); MacHenry v. Dwelling Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 259 F. 880 (D.
Pa. 1919), affd, 263 F. 702 (3d Cir. 1920).
" See Ledford v. Fort Hamilton Hughes Memorial Hosp. Center (in re
Mobley), 15 Bankr. 573 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); See also Ross v. Francis, 72) F.2d
358 (2d Cir. 1934); Quinn v. Union Nat'l Bank, 32 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1929); In re
Specialty Candy Co., 295 F. 508 (7th Cir. 1923).
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therefore antecedent to the payments.12 Accordingly, the fourth
element of a preference is present.
To establish the fifth element of a preference, the bankruptcy
trustee must demonstrate that, at the time of the payment in
question, the company was "insolvent" within the meaning of the
Code. The term "insolvent" is defined by section 101(26) of the
Code to mean that the financial condition of the debtor is such
that the sum of his debts is greater than all of his property, at a
fair valuation, exclusive of property transferred, concealed or
removed with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors."
Although the Code does not provide any guidance as to the
method by which a debtor's assets are to be valued, the assets of
a business entity would presumably be valued as a going
concern." If the company's sole asset is the project, as is sometimes the case when IDBs are used as the financing vehicle, there
will likely be occasions during the construction of the project
when, fairly valued, the project is worth less than the balance of
the indebtedness under the financing agreement. Even after the
completion of the project, its value may be less than such indebtedness as the result of poor maintenance and upkeep, uninsured damage to the project, mismanagement or market conditions that diminish its value. In either case, the company will be
insolvent within the meaning of the Code. It should be emphasized
that the company will be presumed insolvent under section 547
during the 90-day period preceding bankruptcy. 5 If the company's insolvency and a payment by it to the bond trustee are
2 See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981) (a debt is incurred when the debtor legally becomes bound to pay it rather than on successive occassions when each installment matures); Spence v. Lansing Automakers Fed. Credit Union (In re Satterla), 15 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. W.D. Mich 1981);
Iowa Premium Serv. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of St. Louis (In re Iowa Premium
Serv. Co.), 12 Bankr. 597 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981); Paskin v. First Nat'l Bank of
Monroe (In re Donny), 11 Bankr. 451 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981); Belfance v. BancOhio/Nat'l Bank (In re McCormick), 5 Bankr. 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
See supra note 53.
See Edward R. Bacon Co. v. Grover, 420 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1970); In re Am.
Kitchen Foods, 2 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) 715 (D. Me. 1976); Utility Stationery
Stores, Inc. v. American Portfolio (In re Utility Stationery Stores, Inc.), 12 Bankr.
170 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); 4 COLLIER at 547.27. If at the time of transfer the debtor
is only nominally in existence as a business or is on its deathbed, then a going concern valuation of its assets on that date would be inappropriate. See In re Windor
Indus., Inc., 18 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1978). See also COLLIER

101.2611].
" See supra note 54.
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contemporaneous, the fifth element of a preference will be sustained.
The sixth element of a preference requires the bankruptcy
trustee simply to prove that the repayment by the company was
made on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition." If, contrary to the assumption stated earlier, the bond
trustee's interest in the payments received from the company is
not superior under applicable nonbankruptcy law to a judicial
lien thereafter obtained on a simple contract by a creditor of the
company, then as previously discussed the transfer would be
deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of the
petition by the company rather than when it took effect between the parties. The undesirable result would be that even if a
payment was made to the bond trustee outside of the 90-day
preference period, the payment could be deemed to have been
made within the 90-day period and therefore vulnerable to
avoidance.
The seventh and final element of a preference relates to the
effect of the transfer. If the payment by the company to the
bond trustee, when added to the amount of payments to which
the bondholders would be entitled on the balance of their claims
in a Chapter 7 case, enabled the bondholders to receive more
than they would have received in a Chapter 7 case without the
pre-bankruptcy payments, then the payments will be adjudged
preferential." Assume, for example, that within 90 days of its
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 the company pays a total of
$1,000,000 against an IDB indebtedness of $5,000,000, leaving a
balance owed on the IDBs in bankruptcy of $4,000,000. Assume
further that the obligations of the company to the bondholders
are general unsecured claims and that the class of general unsecured claims will receive a payment against the company. The
$1,000,000 pre-bankruptcy transfer, plus the $2,000,000 the bondholders would receive in a Chapter 7 case (50% of $4,000,000)
result in the bondholders realizing a total of $3,000,000.
However, if the pre-bankruptcy transfer had not been made, the
bondholders total claims in the Chapter 7 case would amount to
$5,000,000 and a 50O/ distribution to them in bankruptcy would
yield a net return to them of $2,500,000, or $500,000 less than
what they would receive if the pre-bankruptcy payment had not
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. IH 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (Supp. Im 1979).
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been made. Accordingly, under the facts of this hypothetical, the
seventh element of the preference would be satisfied and the
pre-bankruptcy transfer to the bondholders would be subject to
avoidance. 8
If each of the seven necessary elements of a preference is
established, the bankruptcy trustee is empowered under section
547 to set aside the transfer of funds by the company to the
bond trustee. Additionally, the bankruptcy trustee will be
authorized under section 550 to recover the funds transferred
by the company if they are in the hands of the bond trustee at
the time of bankruptcy.9 Because section 550 sanctions recovery
from both the initial transferee (the bond trustee) or the entity
"for whose benefit such transfer was made" (the bondholders),'0
the bankruptcy trustee could institute a recovery action against
the bondholders themselves."°' Section 550, it should be added,
permits the bankruptcy trustee with court approval to recover
the value of the property in lieu of the property itself,' not only

" If each of the first 6 elements of a preference is established, then the
seventh element will almost assuredly be satisfied where the bankruptcy
distribution to holders of unsecured claims is less than 100%. See Palmer Clay
Prod. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
'
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. M 1979); see Clarke v. New York Trust Co. (In re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co.), 137 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1943; Mercantile Trust Co. v.
Schlafly, 299 F. 202 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 266 U.S. 614 (1924).
11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (Supp. I 1979).
01 An interesting question is whether the bankruptcy trustee might also be
entitled under § 550(a) to recover the value of a preferential transfer from the
issuer as an entity "for whose benefit the transfer was made." It might be
asserted that the company's payments to satisfy its obligations under the financing agreement serve to "benefit" the issuer by reducing the issuer's indebtedness
to the bondholders under the IDBs. While many issuers such as municipalities and
counties are governmental units that enjoy sovereign immunity, some bankruptcy
courts have seized upon the limited waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in § 106
of the Code to justify the prosecution of avoidance actions against governmental
units. See, e.g. Remke, Inc. v. United States (In re Remke, Inc.) 5 Bankr. 24
(Bankr. E.D. Mich 1980).
Notwithstanding the superficial appeal of the above reasoning, recovery
against issuers of IDBs should be denied under § 550(a). In a real sense, the company's payments do not benefit the issuer, inasmuch as the IDBs are nonrecourse
obligations of the issuer. The issuer cannot be said to benefit from a reduction in
the balance owed on the debt which by contract cannot be collected from it in any
event.
"02 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. 1I 1979).
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from the person for whose benefit the initial transfer was made
but also from the initial transferee, who may no longer possess
the property. As a later section of this article points out,"' this
may pose significant problems for the bond trustee who, having
disbursed the funds to the bondholders, no longer possesses the
funds sought to be recovered.
C. Preference Analysis in Issuer Bankruptices
The preceding section of this article examined the potential
for preference recovery in a bankruptcy case involving the company. It is, of course, possible that the issuer rather than the
company will be the subject of a bankruptcy case. However, for
the reasons given below, it is submitted that the preference concerns of bondholders in an issuer bankruptcy are less significant
than in the case of a company bankruptcy.
Issuers of IDBs, which would include municipal corporations,
counties, and industrial development authorities, do not qualify
for relief under either the liquidation provisions of Chapter 7 or
the reorganization provisions of Chapter 11."' Rather, they are
eligible for relief only under Chapter 9 of the Code, which
governs debt adjustments of a municipality."' The term
"municipality," it should be noted, means a political subdivision,
public agency, or instrumentality of a state."' Most, if not all,
issuers would fit within this definition. A municipality may not
commence a Chapter 9 case unless the laws of its state authorize
it to be a debtor under Chapter 9.1°' To date, there are only 16

states that specifically authorize their political subdivisions to
file for such relief."' The issuer in a Chapter 9 case possesses the
103See

infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
4 Section 109(a) and (d) of the Code make clear that only "persons" are eligible
for relief under Chapters 7 and 11. The word "person" is defined by § 101(30) to
include only individuals, partnerships and corporations and to exclude governmental units. Included within the definition of a "government unit" is a
municipality, which, as the text of the article indicates, comprises most issuers of
IDBs. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(21) (Supp. II 1979).
10311 U.S.C. § 109(c) (Supp. II 1979).
11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (Supp. II 1979).
'0 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (Supp. II 1979).
'o' See Dixon & Manthe, Municipal Adjustments in 1981 ANN. SuRv. BANKR.
L. 141, 145 (1981). The 16 states with statutes currently authorizing a municipality
to file for relief under the bankruptcy Code are Arizona, Arkansas, California,
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same power as a trustee in an ordinary bankruptcy case to set
aside preferences. 9 If the issuer should for any reason decline
to exercise its avoidance powers, the court at the request of a
creditor may appoint a trustee for that purpose. '
A threshhold question in the preference analysis of an issuer
bankruptcy is whether the holders of IDBs can be properly considered as creditors of the issuer. A creditor within the meaning
of the Code, it will be recalled, is the holder of a claim against
the debtor."' A claim exists when there is a right to payment
from the debtor or when there is a claim against property of the
debtor."' Because the IDBs are nonrecourse obligations of the
issuer, the bondholders do not have any right to payment from
the issuer. Their sole right to payment is from the company.
This right arises under the financing agreement which the
issuer has assigned to them. Moreover, if the IDB financing is
structured so that the project is titled in the company, then the
bondholders who are granted a mortgage on the project have no
Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Texas. See Dixon &
Manthe, supra at 161, n.45. Georgia specifically prohibits its political subdivisions
from filing for relief under Chapter 9. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 87-606 to 607 (1976);
Compare W. VA. CODE § 31-15-6(o) (1982 Repl. Vol.).
In PennBank v. The Hon. William B. Washabaugh, Jr., 5 COLLIER BANKR.
CAS. 2d 869 (3d Cir. 1981), a secured creditor and the State of Pennsylvania moved
to dismiss a Chapter 9 petition filed by a municipal authority that was incorporated under the Pennsylvania Municipal Authorities Act to construct and
operate a sewer system. The movants contended that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because the Authority had not received permission from the state
to file for such relief as demanded of political subdivisions under PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, §§ 5571-5572 (Purdon 1972). The bankruptcy court ruled that the Authority
was not required to obtain permission from the state because Pennsylvania law
excluded it from the definition of "political subdivision." The secured creditor
thereupon filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit a
petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition seeking to prevent the bankruptcy court from assuming jurisdiction. Without commenting upon the merits of the
case, the Court of Appeals denied the petition because it felt that the issue of
jurisdiction should be raised through the prescribed process of appeal.
10Section 901(a) of the Code makes the preference provisions of § 547 applicable in municipal adjustments. Section 902(4) specifies that the term "trustee"
when used in § 547 shall be understood to mean the debtor in a municipal adjustment case.
,,O
11 U.S.C. § 926 (Supp. 1I 1979).
'
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
"ISee supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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claim against any property of the issuer. Because the issuer's interest in the financing agreement is assigned to the bondholders, the financing agreement is no longer the issuer's property against which the bondholders have a claim. It would appear, therefore, that the bondholders have no claim against the
issuer, and cannot be creditors of the issuer for section 547 purposes, with the possible exception involving situations in which
the issuer retains title to the project.
The foregoing interpretation is borne out by the legislative
history of the Code, which indicates that:
In a case under chapter 9 ... "claim" does not include a right to
payment under an industrial development bond issued by a
municipality as a matter of convenience to a third party....
The bonds are sold on the basis of the credit of the company on
whose behalf they are issued, and the principal, interest, and
premium, if any, are payable solely from payments made by the
company to the trustee under the bond indenture and do not
constitute claims on the tax revenues or other funds of the issuing municipalities. The municipality merely acts as a vehicle to
enable the bonds to be issued on a tax-exempt basis."'
If this legislative history is taken literally, the holders of IDBs
can never be subjected to a successful perference attack in an
issuer bankruptcy because they are not creditors of the issuer.
Even assuming that the bondholders could be deemed creditors of the issuer in situations where the issuer retains title to
the project, it is by no means clear that payments by the company to the bond trustee would constitute a transfer of property
of the issuer. For example, if debt service on the IDBs is paid by
the company out of funds separate and apart from that which it
derives from the project, then no property of the issuer is
transferred to the bondholders. While it might be urged that
those payments are property to which the issuer is entitled
under the financing agreement, the issuer has assigned away its
rights under that agreement to the bond trustee for the bondholders' benefit."
" 124 CONG. REC. H11090 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17406
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). See also CONF. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15,

reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 584-85.
14 An analogous situation was present in the case of Diversified World Inv.,
Ltd. v. Omni Int'l, Ltd. (Inre Diversified World Inv., Ltd.), 12 Bankr. 517 (Bankr.
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If, on the other hand, the company uses project revenues to
pay debt service on the IDBs, the question of whose property is
S.D. Tex. 1981). There the debtor purchased an airplane on an installment sale
basis and leased the airplane to a third party. To further secure payment of the
purchase price, the debtor assigned to the seller all rental payments due to it
from the third party. After the debtor commenced a case under Chapter 11, it
brought an adversary proceeding as debtor in possession to recover from its
seller the sum of $637,340 in payments received by the seller from the lessee
within 90 days of bankruptcy. The seller moved to dismiss the proceeding on two
grounds: first, because the assignment of rentals, which took place outside the
90-day preference period, was complete when made; and second, because the payments received by it during the 90-day period were not transfers within the
meaning of § 547(e). The court rejected the seller's argument and ruled that payments made to the seller as assignee of rentals that the debtor otherwise would
have received were avoidable transfers under § 547. The court reasoned that the
rental payments to the seller were "indirect transfers made for the benefit of"
the debtor in that they were "intended to reduce" the debtor's obligations to the
seller. Moreover, the court concluded that the debtor did not acquire any right to
the rentals until they became due from the lessee. Because a transfer does not occur
within the meaning of § 547(e) until the debtor had acquired rights in the property
transferred, the court held that the transfer of the debtor's property took place
as the rents accrued under the lease and not when the future rights to those rental
payments were originally assigned. Id. at 519.
If one were to adopt the rationale of the court in Diversified World, then
payments made by the company under a financing agreement that has been
assigned to the bond trustee by the issuer to secure the IDBs would entail
transfers of property of the issuer, and would satisfy the second element of a
preference. It is submitted, however, that the court's reasoning in the Diversified
World decision was based on a misconstruction of § 547(e). The debtor's right to
receive rent under the lease constituted property of the debtor. The assignment
of that right effectuated a transfer to the seller of all matured and unmatured
rents under the lease. The seller in Diversified World, therefore, correctly
asserted that the assignment by the debtor was a complete transfer of its property rights when it was made. The factual situation is no different from a pledge by
a debtor of an installment note to secure his debt to the pledgee. The pledge itself
is a transfer of the debtor's property and that transfer carries with it the right to
receive the future installment payments upon the debtor's default.
Even if one were to accept the court's logic in Diversified World that the
debtor had no rights in the rental payments until they matured, the court's result
is not dictated by that logic. The rental payments represented nothing more than
proceeds of a "receivable" (the right to payments under the lease), within the
meaning of § 547(a)(3), to which the seller's lien by assignment attached. As provided in § 547(c)(5) of the Code, a transfer of a perfected security interest in a
receivable or its proceeds is not subject to avoidance except to the extent that
the creditor's claim on the ninetieth day before bankruptcy was not fully secured
and the aggregate of all such transfers during the 90-day period caused a reduction in the creditor's collateral deficiency to the prejudice of unsecured creditors.
The payment to the seller of the rentals did not operate to reduce any collateral
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being transferred becomes a closer one. While the issuer may
have legal title to the project itself, it does not necessarily
follow that the issuer's interest extends to the income stream
generated from the company's operation of the project. In all
events, the issuer's legal interest, if any, does not give it an
equitable interest in the project revenues, which pursuant to
the financing agreement and other IDB documentation are dedicated exclusively to repayment of the debt under the financing
agreement and ultimately to payment of the IDBs. Because use
of the project revenues to pay the bondholders does not deplete
the issuer's estate of funds to which it has any equitable interest, it cannot be said that the bondholders have been preferred over other creditors of the issuer."' In sum, by assigning to
the bond trustee its right to payment under the financing agreement, the issuer has effectively divested itself of any equitable
interest in the project revenues.'
From a purely technical point of view, the payments by the
company to the bond trustee are not made on account of an antedeficiency by virtue of any increase in the value of the lease. On the contrary,
payments on a lease for a fixed term diminish the value of the lease, and, in the
Diversified World case, neither improved nor worsened the collateral position of
the seller. Thus, the rental payments within 90 days of bankruptcy would be immune from avoidance under the exception afforded by § 547(c)(5) of the Code.
"I Although not expressly made an element of a preference under § 547, a
number of pre-Code cases have held that the transfer must result in some depletion of the debtor's estate before there can be a preference. See Continental &
Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. Chicago T. & Savings Co., 229 U.S. 435 (1913);
In re Windor Indus. Inc., 18 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 688. (N.D. Tex. 1978).
116 It should be noted that in situations where the issuer assigns its rights
and interests under the financing agreement and the mortgage on the project to
the bond trustee, the assignment would effect a transfer of property of the issuer.
See Feilbach Co. v. Russell, 233 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1916). If each of the remaining
elements of a preference could be established, the issuer's bankruptcy within 90
days of the assignment arguably could result in a § 547 avoidance. However, the
assignment could qualify under § 547(c)(1) as an exception to the general
preference rules. This exception exempts from preference attack a transfer that
was intended by the debtor (issuer) and creditor to or for whose benefit the
transfer was made (bondholders) to be a "contemporaneous exchange for new
value" given to the debtor, but only if the transfer was in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (Supp. 1I 1979).
Such an assignment, however, would not constitute a preference in the event
of the company's bankruptcy because the net effect, the substitution of one creditor (the bondholders) for another (the issuer), does not result in any depletion of
the company's estate. See Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70
(2d Cir. 1938); In re Loring, 30 F. Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1939).
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cedent debt owed by the issuer to the bondholders. The company's payments to the bondholders are, strictly speaking, in
satisfaction of the debt of the company under the financing
agreement."" Admittedly these payments are in precisely the
amount of the debt service on the IDBs and are applied directly
to offset the IDB obligations. But it is at least arguable that the
fourth element is not satisfied by payments from the company
to the bond trustee to discharge the company's obligations
under the financing agreement.
As a practical matter it will be an exceedingly difficult task
for the issuer in a preference action to prove the preferential effect of the transfers to the bond trustee. To do so, the issuer
must demonstrate what its creditors generally, and the bondholders in particular, would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation
case."' Establishing the liquidation value of the assets of a
political subdivision will be both time consuming and extremely
expensive, and in many instances the issuer and its other creditors may conclude that the costs are simply not worth the contest. Moreover, the question of how much the issuer's creditors
would receive in a Chapter 7 case would necessarily be based
upon a theoretical valuation of its assets because a municipality
is not eligible for Chapter 7 relief,1 9 and its assets may not be involuntarily liquidated."'
Apart from the legal and practical difficulties of sustaining a
preference action against the holders of IDBs, the threat of an
issuer bankruptcy in the first instance is significantly less than
the threat of a company bankruptcy. Unlike most non-public entites and individuals, municipalities may not be placed involun117

An IDB financing is structured in many respects like a common law nova-

tion. A novation is effected by the substitution of a new debtor in the place of the
old one, with the intent to release the latter and with the assent of all parties to
the substitution. See generally 58 Am. JuR. 2D Novation § 1 (1971). For example, A
(the company) owes B (the issuer) the same amount that B owes C (the bondholders), and B at the request of C orders A to pay that sum to C. Unlike a novation, however, the participants in an IDB financing do not intend that the obligations under the 1DBs will be extinguished.
' See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)(A) (Supp. I 1979).
,,g
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See H.R. REP.No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 263, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6221; Leco Properties v. R.E. Crummer & Co., 128

F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1942).
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tarily into bankruptcy"' and may not voluntarily seek bankruptcy
protections unless certain conditions are satisfied," including
proof that the municipality is insolvent or unable to meet its
debts as they mature" and is not seeking simply to evade its
creditors or to obtain a moratorium on its debt service obliga"
tions. 24
' Moreover, issuers in many IDB financings are industrial
development authorities, created by statute for the purpose of
stimulating economic development through the issuance of nonrecourse debt obligations that qualify for tax-exempt treatment.
Because of the nonrecourse nature of the debt obligations they
are allowed to incur,' there is no incentive for them to seek an
adjustment of their debts under Chapter 9 of the Code. Nor is
there any incentive on their part to use Chapter 9 as a means to
stave off foreclosure on a project which, though sometimes titled
in the issuer, is in reality beneficially owned by the company
and therefore primarily the company's economic concern. Where
the issuer is a municipal corporation, county, or other political
subdivision having recourse debt obligations that it may have an
incentive to adjust, the political consequences of bankruptcy as
well as the legal requirements for Chapter 9 eligibility provide
in many cases a countervailing disincentive to the bankruptcy
alternative.
In summary, the likelihood of a successful preference attack
on bondholders in an issuer bankruptcy are, for both legal and
...
11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (Supp. III 1979).
Section 303(b) of the Code makes provision for involuntary bankruptcy cases
only under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 of the Code. Moreover, § 901(a) of the Code
makes applicable to Chapter 9 cases the provisions of § 301 of the Code, which
authorizes voluntary bankruptcy cases, but does not incorporate the provisions of
§ 303 relating to involuntary cases.
The filing of an involuntary petition by a creditor of a municipality would
constitute an impermissible interference with the governmental affairs of the
political subdivision involved. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49-50
(1938). See generally, 4 COLLIER, at 6 900.02 & 900.03 (1981).
"=11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (Supp. I1 1979).
"=11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (Supp. III 1979). For a pre-Code case in which an irrigation district was found to be solvent in a balance sheet sense, but unable to
meet its maturing obligations on a cash basis, see Fano v. Newport Heights Irr.
Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940).
...
These conditions, while not expressly set forth in the Code, are implicit in
the requirement contained in § 921(c) that the petition filed by the municipality be
dismissed if, upon the objection of a creditor, it is found not to have been filed in
good faith. See 4 COLLIER at 900.03 at 900-16 (15th ed. 1981).
n See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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practical reasons, remote. Investors in IDBs should, therefore,
focus their concerns on the credit standing of the company and
the adverse consequences to them in the event of a company
bankruptcy.
D. Preference Concerns of Bond Trustees and Guarantors
It will be recalled that section 550 enables the bankruptcy
trustee to recover the property transferred or, if the court
orders, the value of the property, either from the persons for
whose benefit the transfer was made (the bondholders), from the
intitial transferee (the bond trustee), or both. 2 ' Hence, even
though the bond trustee no longer is in possession of the funds
that were the subject of the bankruptcy trustee's avoidanceaction
under section 547, the bond trustee would, under a literal reading of section 550, remain liable for the value of the transferred
funds if the court authorized the bankruptcy trustee to recover
such value in lieu of the property itself. It is submitted that the
court should not sanction recovery from the bond trustee of the
value of the payments disbursed by it as a fiduciary to the bondholders since the bond trustee is clearly an innocent intermediary. As noted by one commentator: "In such circumstances, the bankruptcy court should exercise its discretion
to use its equitable powers under section 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. §
1481 to prevent an inequitable result."'"
Similarly, guarantors have rather unique preference concerns of their own in an IDB financing. First, guarantors must
be ever mindful of the possibility of a preference recovery by
the bankruptcy trustee from the bond trustee or the bondholders. Such a recovery will have the effect of increasing the
extent of the guarantor's exposure under the guaranty agreement. Even if the IDBs are paid in full prior to bankruptcy and
the guarantor's contingent liability to the bondholders extinguished, a later recovery of a preferential payment from the
bondholders will likely operate to revive the guarantor's liability
to them."
' See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
4 COLLIER at 550.02 at 550-7 (15th ed. 1981).
12 See, e.g., Herman Cantor Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Herman
Cantor Corp.), 15 Bankr. 747, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (noting that "although a
surety is usually discharged by payment of the debt, he continues to be liable if
'2
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Second, it should be emphasized that section 547 makes
possible the avoidance of transfers that are "for the benefit" of a
creditor of the debtor." A guarantor, at the time of each payment by the debtor holds a contingent claim for reimbursement
from the debtor in the event the guarantor is called upon to
satisfy the debtor's obligations to the creditor.'
The
guarantor's claim, though contingent, is a "claim" within the
broad meaning of the Code"' and the guarantor is therefore a
creditor of the debtor. Transfers by the debtor in payment of
the creditor's claim operate to benefit the guarantor inasmuch
as they reduce his exposure under the guaranty agreement with
the creditor.13 ' If the transfer is avoided under section 547, then
section 550, which authorizes the bankruptcy trustee to recover
the property transferred or with court approval its value from
the person "for whose benefit such transfer was made,""' would
apparently permit recovery of the value of the transfer from the
guarantor." Case law under the preference provisions of both
the payment constitutes a preference under bankruptcy law"). See also Horner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 149 Va. 854, 141 S.E. 767 (1928) (a preferential payment is deemed
by law to be no payment at all).
1- 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (Supp. II 1979).
110Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887 (lst Cir. 1981). Prudence dictates that a
formal, written contract of reimbursement be executed between the guarantor
and the debtor so that the scope of the debtor's reimbursement obligation can be
specifically defined. However, even in the absence of an express agreement, an implied right of reimbursement or indemnity arises from the relationship. See, e.g.,
Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland v. Hobbs, 144 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1944); Howell v.
Commissioner, 69 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1934); McConnell v. Scott, 15 Ohio 401 (1846).
See generally RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104(2) (1941); 38 AM. JuR. 2D Guaranty
§ 127 (1968).
"I The Code's definition of "claim" includes an right to payment, whether or
not such right is contingent. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (Supp. III 1979). A contingent claimant, however, is not a "creditor" unless its claim against the debtor "arose at
the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(9)(A) (Supp. III 1979). A guarantor's contingent claim arises at the time the
assured creditor extends to the debtor credit that the guarantor is bound to pay
if the debtor does not. Moreover, § 502(e)(2) of the Code makes clear that a reimbursement claim which becomes fixed after the commencement of the case is
treated as if it had becomed fixed before the filing of the petition.
"' See Herman Cantor Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (in re Herman Cantor
Corp.), 15 Bankr. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981).
"9 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
"9 See, e.g., Seeley 'v. Church Bldg. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldg. &
Interiors, Inc.) 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
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the Code '3 5 and the former Bankruptcy Act' 8 appear to give support to this interpretation. Thus, in an IDB financing, if a
transfer is set aside under section 547, the bankruptcy trustee
may well seek recovery under sectin 550 from the guarantor.137
There is one further area of concern for guarantors in an
IDB financing. If, as is often the case, the company is a whollyowned subsidiary of the guarantor, the guarantor may be adjudged to be a "person in control of the debtor"'38 or an "affiliate"'33 of the debtor and, therefore, an "insider"'4 ° of the debtor.
14
It will be recalled from the previous discussion in the text '
that, with respect to an insider creditor, the 90-day reach-back
period for a preference is extended to include the period between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.'42 Thus, if in an IDB financing a payment by
the company outside of the 90-day preference period applicable
"'

IcL

See, e.g. Cooper Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 379 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1967);
Fenold v. Green, 175 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1949); In re Schleicher Printing Corp., 62
F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1933); Walker v. Wilkinson, 3 F.2d 867 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
268 U.S. 701 (1925); Swarts v. Siegel, 117 F. 13 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 187
U.S. 638 (1902); Kobusch v. Hand, 156 F. 660 (8th Cir. 1907), cert.denied, 209 U.S.
547 (1908); Pennington v. Less, 183 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Ala. 1959); Irving Trust Co.
v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 8 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); Stern v. Paper, 183 F.
228 (D.N.D. 1910), aff'd, 198 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1912).
I" As pointed out earlier in the text, supra note 33 and accompanying text,
the guarantor's undertaking may entail a guaranty of payment of either the IDBs
themselves or the obligations under the financing agreement, or in some cases
both. If payment of the IDBs alone is guaranteed, then strictly speaking the
guarantor has no contingent claim against, and therefore is not a creditor with
respect to, the company, unless the guaranty agreement otherwise gives the
guarantor a right of recourse against the company. Absent such a right of
recourse, any payments by the company should not be considered to be "for the
benefit of' a creditor of the company because the guarantor, although benefitted
by the payments, has no claim against the company.
12 The Code's definition of "insider" includes any "person in control of the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(B)(iii) (Supp. I1 1979).
'1 The term "affiliate" is defined by § 101(2) to include: "[An] entity that
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor .... 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)
(Supp. I1 1979). An "affiliate," as defined above, is an insider of the debtor. 11
U.S.C. § 101(25)(E) (Supp. II 1979).
"' 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (Supp. 1I 1979).
UI See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
"a 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. II 1979).
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to the bond trustee and-bondholders preferentially benefits an
insider guarantor, the bankruptcy trustee may be barred from
avoiding and recovering the transfer as against both the bond
trustee and the bondholders, but may have a sustainable cause
of action against the guarantor."'
In light of the preference risks to which they may be subject, bond trustees and guarantors of IDB issues should take
steps to maximize their protection against such occurrences.
", See 4 COLLIER
550.02 at 550-7 (15th ed. 1981).
The case of In re Schleicher Printing Corp., 62 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1933) is illustrative of a situation in which a guarantor may be subject to preference attack
while the actual transferee is not. In Schleicher, the 50% owner and president of
the corporate debtor guaranteed the debtor's note for $2,000 to a bank. The note
was also secured by a first mortgage in favor of the bank on the debtor's property.
Approximately 30 days before its bankruptcy, the corporation paid $1,827 to the
bank. The court found that the payment benefitted the guarantor by reducing his
exposure under the guaranty and was therefore preferential as to him. However,
the court ruled that the payment did not result in a preference to the bank,
because the bank did not have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent (as required by the predecessor section to § 547).
The court's decision in Schleicher is consistent with the result that would
have been reached on similar facts under § 547. Although the bank in that case
escaped preference attack because of its lack of reasonable cause to believe insolvency, that element of a preference has been deleted under § 547 except in situations involving an insider transferee. However, assuming that the $2,000 note of
the bank was fully secured by the mortgage on the debtor's property, the bank
could have successfully defended a preference action under the Code. See infra
note 145 and accompanying text. Furthermore, if the payment to the bank had
been made more than 90 days, but less than one year, prior to the bankruptcy, the
90-day rule would bar recovery from the bank. The guarantor, however, as an insider of the debtor, would nonetheless be accountable for the transfer. See Seeley
v. Church Bldg. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldg. & Interiors), 14 Bankr. 128
Ed. 74 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981). One commentator has concluded that, even if a
transfer is voidable under § 547 only as against an insider guarantor who benefitted from it, the property transferred or its value may be recovered under § 550
not only from the guarantor but also from the transferee creditor. Pitts, Insider
Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 Am. BANKR. L. J. 343 (1981). Other
authorities, while conceding that a literal reading of § 550 might permit such a
result, have concluded that recovery should be restricted to the insider guarantor. 4 COLLIER 550.02 at 550-7 (15th ed. 1981); accord, Seeley v. Church Bldg. &
Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldg. & Interiors), 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1981). Otherwise, these authorities observe, a creditor who does not insist upon a
third-party guaranty might be better off than he Would be with one. In the view
of the authors of this article, Congress did not intent to sanction recovery under §
550 from persons who did not within the meaning of § 547 preferentially receive
or benefit from the transfer.
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Bond trustees, for example, should insist upon provisions in the
indenture that give to them a first lien upon all security for the
IDBs, including all revenues from the project and payments
received by them for the bondholders, to indemnify them
against any losses sustained in their fiduciary capacities.
Guarantors should require provisons in the guaranty agreement
giving to them subrogation rights to all security for the IDBs to
the extent that they are called upon either to satisfy the bondholders' claims against the company or to absorb any losses
resulting from preference claims of the bankruptcy trustee. Alternatively, a guarantor might, in an appropriate case, consider
releasing the company from any claim of reimbursement that
might result from payments that the guarantor is called upon to
make under the guaranty. By releasing its reimbursement
rights, the guarantor might foreclose the argument that it has a
claim against the company and that it is thereby a creditor of
the company.
E. Fully and PartiallySecured IDB Issues
As a general rule in IDB financings, the project stands as
collateral security for the payment of the IDBs. If the IDB
financing is structured so that the issuer is the owner of the project, the issuer will normally grant a mortgage or security interest in favor of the bond trustee to secure the IDBs. If the
company holds title to the project, the company will either mortgage the project to the issuer to secure the financing agreement, which the issuer in turn assigns to the bond trustee, or
mortgage the project directly to the bond trustee to secure the
financing agreement or the IDBs themselves. The net effect, in
any event, is that the bondholders through the bond trustee
have recourse against the project in the event of a default in
payment of the IDBs.
As observed earlier in this article, a transfer is not voidable
under section 547 unless it has a preferential effect."' In the
case of a transfer to the holder of an unsecured claim, the effect
of the transfer is determined by first adding the value of the
transfer to the distribution that the creditor would receive on
the balance of his claim in a Chapter 7 case, and by then comparing the resulting figure with what the distribution to the creditor would have been on the full amount of his claim had the pre'" See supra note 97 accompanying text.
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bankruptcy transfer not been made. If the net effect is that the
transfer enabled the creditor to enhance his position over what
it would have been without the transfer, then as previously noted
the seventh element of a preference is present.
In the case of a transfer to the holder of a fully secured
claim, a different result may be dictated. If the value of the debtor's property equals or exceeds the creditor's claim, then a payment on account of the fully secured claim would not enable the
creditor to receive more than he would receive in a Chapter 7
case had the pre-bankruptcy payment not been made. The payment would therefore not be preferential." 5 This result follows
because in a Chapter 7 case, the fully secured creditor's claim
would be satisfied in full from this collateral with or without the
pre-bankruptcy payment."' A question that is not clearly resolv145 See, e.g., Roemelmeyer v. Walter E. Heller & Company Southeast, Inc.
(In re Lackow Bros., Inc.), 19 Bankr. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Gilbert v. Gem City
Say. Ass'n (In re Hale), 15 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Delaware Valley
Consumer Discount Co. v. Burke (in re Burke), 10 Bankr. 163 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981); Gertz v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re Conn), 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981); Mazer v. Aetna Fin. Co. (in re Zuni), 6 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980);
Turner v. College Point Say. Bank (In re Castillo), 7 Bankr. 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980). See also In re Payless Bldg. & Remodeling, Inc., 23 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
317 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
For similar cases under pre-Code preference law, see Kapela v. Newman, 649
F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1981); Bachner v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1939); Irving
Trust Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 68 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1934); De Aragon v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 322 F. Supp. 1006 (D. P.R. 1971); Peters v. White County
Farm Supply Inc. (In re Templeton), 1 Bankr. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1979); In re
Landry, 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1087 (D. Vt. 1975). See generally Countryman,
Avoidance of Secured Transactions,8 U.C.C. L.J. 315, 320-22 (1976).
I" The effect of a transfer to a fully secured creditor is no different in situations where a person other than the debtor, such as a guarantor, collateralizes the
creditor's claim. Accordingly, it should be inconsequential, as far as the seventh
element of a preference is concerned, whether the issuer or the company is the
owner of the project that secures payment of the IDBs.
In the case of Herman Cantor Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Herman
Cantor Corp.), 15 Bankr. 747 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), however, the bankruptcy
court ruled that a creditor whose claim was fully secured by property of a guarantor could be required to disgorge payments received from the debtor within 90
days of bankruptcy. The court reasoned that the seventh element of a preference
was satisfied because the debtor's payments benefitted the guarantor by reducing her exposure under the guaranty and enabled her to receive (or retain) more
than she would have received (or retained) if the case were a Chapter 7 case and
the payments had not been made. It is submitted that the court was correct in
determing that a preference existed, but incorrectly concluded that the preferential transfer was recoverable from the creditor. For the reasons discussed earlier
in the text, see supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text, the guarantor in Her-
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ed by section 547, however, and one not yet squarely addressed
by the courts, is the date as of which a valuation of the creditor's
collateral, and therefore the net effect of the transfer, is to be
made. An answer to this question is essential in those cases in
which the value of the collateral fluctuates. If the collateral
value is at all times greater than the amount of debt it secures,
then of course the question of the proper date for valuation is of
academic interest only.
To illustrate, assume that the project securing the IDBs is
worth $1,000,000 on the date that the company makes a payment
of $100,000 and that the total IDB indebtedness on that date is
$900,000. On the transfer date, the bondholders' claims are fully
secured and, if the project were then liquidated in a Chapter 7
case, their claims would be satisfied in full regardless of
whether or not the $100,000 payment had been made. Hence, using
the transfer date as the date of valuation, no preference would
result. Assume further that a bankruptcy petition is filed on the
ninetieth day following the transfer and the value of the project
has declined to $800,000. With the aid of the pre-bankruptcy
transfer, the balance of the bondholders' claims would be retired
from a liquidation of the project notwithstanding its decline in
value: $900,000 - [$800,000 + $100,000] = 0. If the pre-bankruptcy
transfer had not been made, the bondholders would have realized
a deficiency from a liquidation of the project in precisely the
amount of the transfer: ($900,000 - $800,000 = $100,000). Using
the date of bankruptcy as the date of valuation, it can be seen
that the pre-bankruptcy payment enabled the bondholders to
receive more than they otherwise would have received. Finally,
assume that the bankruptcy trustee files a section 547 action
against the bondholders some 120 days after bankruptcy and the
value of the project has increased in value to $950,000. If then liquidated, the project would net to the bondholders a sum sufficient to satisfy the full amount of their claims without the
benefit of the pre-bankrupty transfer. It is apparent, therefore,
that the date selected by the court to test the value of the collateral securing a claim can be critical to the outcome of the
preference action.
Some guidance on this question can be found in Palmer Clay
Products Co. v. Brown,14 7 a case arising under the predecessor
man Cantor was the only party to receive a preference.
297 U.S. 227 (1936).
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preference section to section 547. Concluding that the effect of
the transfer is not to be determined as of the date of transfer,
the Supreme Court in Palmer stated:
Whether a creditor has received a preference is to be determined,
not by what the situation would have been if the debtor's assets
had been liquidated and distributed among his creditors at the
time the alleged preferential payment was made, but by the actual effect of the payment as determined when bankruptcy
results.... We may not assume that Congress intended to disregard the actual result, and to introduce the impractical rule of
requiring the determination, as of the date of each payment, of
the hypothetical question: What would have been the financial
result if the assets had then been liquidated and the proceeds
distributed among the then creditors.'"
While the Palmer case does clarify when the effect of the
transfer is not to be determined in the case of transfers to unsecured creditors,"' it does not resolve precisely when it is to be
determined, particularly in the case of transfers to creditors
holding secured claims. 5 In cases decided thus far under the
Id. at 229.
Some respected commentators have read the Palmer case to mean that
the effect of the transfer is to be determined as of the date of the commencement
14

",

of the bankruptcy case. See, e.g., P. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS INBANKRUPTCY

§ 10.12 (1981). While the Court in Palmer may have intended the date of
bankruptcy to be the proper determination date, it indicated that the "actual effect" of the transfer "when bankruptcy results" is controlling, 297 U.S. at 229,
which might imply that the determination is to be made at the time the issue
arises in the context of a preference action, when the actual result of the transfer
can more precisely be measured. See Belfance v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re
Gastaldo), 13 Bankr. 808 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981). Moreover, the Palmercase does
not foreclose theargument that the effect of a transfer to the holder of a secured
claim should be measured by testing the value of the security on the transfer
date. See infra note 154.
11 The court in Baranow v. Gibraltar Factors Corp. (In re Hygrade Envelope
Corp.), 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1968) was confronted with a situation in which the
value of the collateral transferred to the creditor significantly increased by the
time of the debtor's bankruptcy. The creditor in Hygrade took an assignment
from its insolvent corporate debtor of a "key man" term insurance policy in the
face amount of $100,000 on the life of the debtor's general manager to secure a preexisting debt of some $300,000. At the time of the assignment, the surrender
value of the policy was $393. Nine days after the assignment, the general
manager died and the creditor received a payment under the policy of $101,000.
Shortly thereafter the debtor was placed involuntarily into bankruptcy. Its
trustee sought to recover from the creditor the value of the insurance policy,
which the trustee asserted was equal in amount to the proceeds received
thereunder by the creditor. The creditor argued, and the lower court agreed, that
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Code, the courts have not as yet squarely addressed the question. Some courts have appeared to determine the effect of the

transfer by adopting the valuations given to the creditor's collateral in the debtor's schedule of assets,15' which sometimes

reflect value on the date the schedule is prepared. Other courts
appear to have used the value of the collateral on the date of the

filing of the petition as the proper date for testing value.'52 Still
others have used the most current valuation of the collateral

during the bankruptcy case."' In none of these cases did the
court consider whether the value of the collateral on the date

selected was equal to, greater than, or less than its value on the
transfer date.'

Although the proper date of valuation remains

the extent of the preference, if any, was the value of the policy at the time of its
transfer, or $393. Reversing the lower court on this point, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the effect of the transfer, and
therefore, the value of the policy as collateral, was to be determined not on the
date that the transfer occurred but rather at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy.
It should be underscored that the Hygrade case did not involve a valuation
of collateral for the purpose of determining whether a preference had been received.
In Hygrade the essential question presented was. not whether a preferential
transfer resulted from the assignment; rather the question was whether the
trustee was limited in his recovery to the value of the property at the time of
transfer. By ruling that the trustee could recover the increased value of the
policy at maturity, however, the court emphasized the effect of the transfer as of
the time of bankruptcy. Hygrade, therefore, might be interpreted to stand for the
proposition that a transfer to a creditor who is fully secured at the time of the
transfer may be invalidated to the extent that the creditor is not fully secured by
collateral as valued on the date of bankruptcy. See Tait & Williams, Bankruptcy
Preference Laws: The Scope of Section 547(c)(2), 99 BANKING L.J. 55, 64 n.28
(1982). It is submitted that such an interpretation of Hygrade is erroneous. The
case stands solely for the proposition that if the transfer of the collateral itself is
voidable, the bankruptcy trustee may recover the full value of the collateral, including any appreciation in such value following the transfer.
5I See, e.g., Roemelmeyer v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc. (In re
Lackow Bros., Inc.), 19 Bankr. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (court tested collateral
values on both the ninetieth day before and the date of bankruptcy); Barash v.
Public Fin. Corp. (Inre Dennis), 658 F.2d 504, 506 n.1 (7th Cir. 1981).
"I See, e.g., Ryen v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Bullen), 11
Bankr. 440 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford
Sales, Inc. (Inre Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc.), 10 Bankr. 632 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1981); Gertz v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (Inre Conn), 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1981).
151See, e.g., Belfance v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (Inre McCormick), 5 Bankr. 762
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
" It is arguable that the effect of a payment on a claim that is fully secured
at the time of the transfer should be measured on the transfer date. Because the
payment operates to increase the debtor's equity in the property securing the
claim, the transfer does not operate to deplete the debtor's estate. See Gilbert v.
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uncertain, the bankruptcy trustee should have the burden of
proof on the issue of the value of the collateral.155
In an IDB financing to enable the project's construction, the
project prior to completion will likely be valued at less than the
total IDB indebtedness. If, as is usually the case, proceeds from
the IDB issue are held in escrow for construction withdrawals
by the company, and the funds so held are pledged to secure the
IDBs, then the total of such funds must be added to the value of
the uncompleted project to ascertain the value of the bondholders' total collateral security. When the aggregate of those
values is less than the outstanding IDB indebtedness, the bondholders' claims are only partially secured.15 Section 506(a) of the
Code classifies the partially secured claimant as the holder of
two separate claims: a secured claim to the extent of the collateral
value, and an unsecured claim for the amount of the total claim
in excess of such value."7 If the bondholders' claims are
undersecured on the date as of which valuation is determined,
current case law indicates any pre-bankruptcy payments by the
company will in the absence of sufficient contrary evidence be
presumed to have been applied by the bondholders to the unsecured portion of their claims and therefore susceptible to section 547 avoidance.58

Payments from the proceeds of validly pledged property do
not effect a preference and the burden is upon the bankruptcy
Gem City Say. Ass'n (In re Hale), 15 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
Moreover, such a build-up in equity arguably qualifies the transaction as a "contemporaneous exchange for new value" under § 547(c)(1), which is exempt from
preference attack.
155See, e.g., Gertz v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re Conn), 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1981).
' See supra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
1 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (Supp. III 1979).
15 See, e.g., Barash v. Public Fin. Corp. (In re Dennis), 658 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir.
1981); Belfance v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank (In re McCormick), 5 Bankr. 726 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1980); Trimble v. McCoy Bros., Ltd. (In re Hawkins Mfg., Inc.), 11
Bankr. 512 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
In a case under the former bankruptcy laws, the court ruled that when the
security held by the bond trustee was insufficient in value to pay the bondholders, a payment made to the trustee for the bondholders' benefit while the
corporate debtor was insolvent, which was to pay interest and retire matured
bonds, was voidable as a preference. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schlafly, 299 F. 202
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 614 (1924).
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trustee to show that the payments were not made from such
proceeds." 9 Accordingly, any payments received by the bondholders from the company's sale of, or the bond trustee's foreclosure upon, the property should not give rise to a preference
claim if the mortgage was validly perfected and not otherwise
subject to avoidance under section 547.
IV.

A.

CIRCUMVENTING THE PREFERENCE PROBLEM

Innovations in the Marketplace

Today's inflationary economy has rendered even tax-exempt
interest rates prohibitively expensive to many companies, and
has decreased the amount of capital available for investment in
debt obligations generally. In order to gain renewed access to
the marketplace at feasible interest rates, therefore, several innovative approaches have been devised. 60 One such approach is

12 See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1981); Israel v. Woodruff,
299 F. 454 (2d Cir. 1924); Howard v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp.
279 (W.D. Pa. 1962); In re Markim, Inc., 15 Bankr. 56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (dicta).
'" One recent innovation is municipal bond insurance. The insurance
guarantees the payment of principal and interest only on certain new issues of
municipal bonds. Generally, the IDB issue must be investment grade in order to
qualify for the insurance. However, it enables financially sound issuers of small to
medium sized EDB issues to appeal to a broader market, which helps reduce interest cost. Two firms that currently offer municipal bond insurance are
Municipal Bond Insurance Association and American Municipal Bond Assurance
Corporation.
Two other methods of enhancing the security behind IDBs are a bond purchase agreement and an irrevocable loan commitment. Pursuant to a bond purchase agreement, a bank or some other financially secure institution agrees to
purchase the IDBs upon the failure by the company to pay when due any installment of principal or interest. An irrevocable loan commitment obligates the bank
or other institution to lend money to the company for the sole purpose of paying
installments of principal and interest on the IDBs in the event that funds are not
otherwise available to the company for that purpose. See Baron, Debt Supported
by Irrevocable Letters of Credit Irrevocable Commitments and Note Purchase
Agreements, Fixed Income Investor, June 21, 1980.
Although an analysis of the bankruptcy implications of these two methods is
beyond the scope of this article, it would appear that both methods afford protection to bondholders against recovery by a bankruptcy trustee of payments made
to them. The payment of the purchase price under a bond purchase agreement is
not made from company funds, and therefore such a payment would not entail any
transfer of the company's property. In the case of an irrevocable loan commitment, a bankruptcy trustee might contend that payments to the bondholders
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the addition of a new participant to IDB transactions in the form
of a bank or other financially secure lending institution (the
"bank"). The role of the bank is to further assure payment of the
IDBs through the issuance of a letter of credit'' pursuant to
which funds are made available to the bond trustee to pay installments of principal and interest when due to the bondholders.
The benefits accruing from the bank's. participation through
the letter of credit are significant. First, the credit of the bank is
substituted for the credit of the company. Second, the introduction of the strong credit of the bank may permit the rating of
IDB issues which otherwise might not receive an investment
grade rating.'' Although the first benefit in itself significantly
increases access to the marketplace and therefore lowers interest costs, a rating is even more effective in accomplishing
those ends.
IDB ratings are primarily supplied by two major services:
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and Standard & Poor's Company. 6' Normally both services will, for a fee, analyze the creditfrom the loan proceeds involve transfers of property of the company. For the
reasons discussed later in the text, see infra note 109 and accompanying text, the
bankruptcy trustee's contention should be rejected.
"' Letters of credit issued by domestic banks qualify for an exemption from
registration under § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(2) (1977))
as "securities issued or guaranteed by any bank" whether or not the obligation
they secure qualifies for such an exemption. See Daon Corp. [1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 76,340 (1980); California First Bank [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)

81,680 (1978).

The SEC recently addressed the issue of whether letters of credit issued by
domestic branches of foreign banks qualify for the exemption from registration
available to domestic banks. In general, the SEC has advised that it would not
recommend enforcement action as a result of failure to register letters of credit
issued by foreign bank branches in the United States to secure payment of
securities that would otherwise be exempt from registration under the Securities
Act of 1933. See Barclays Bank Int'l, Ltd. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,080 (1982) (letter of credit securing IDBs exempt from registration); National Westminister Bank, Ltd. [1981-82 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 77,081 (1982) (letter of credit securing non-exempt notes subject to
registration); Societe Generale-New York [1980-81 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP (CCH) 77,775 (1981) (letter of credit securing IDBs exempt from registration). See also supra note 32.
..See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
18 Although their role in the marketplace is relatively minor compared to
Standard & Poor's Corporation and Moody's Investors Service, Inc., the two
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worthiness of an obligor and the terms of the specific financing
and will give an obligation an investment "rating" based upon that
analysis. Among other things, these ratings give unsophisticated investors a benchmark to determine the attractiveness of a potential investment against an objective
standard."' In fact, ratings are required by certain institutional
investors, either as a matter of law or because of the particular
institution's internal policy. The ratings are based, in varying
degrees, on at least three considerations: the nature of the
obligation, the likelihood of default, and the protection afforded
to, and relative position of, the bondholder in the event of liquidation or reorganization under the bankruptcy laws or other
laws affecting creditors' rights and remedies.
As a condition to rating an IDB issue secured by a letter of
credit, the rating agencies have required an opinion of counsel
with regard to, among other things, the potential for recovery
by a bankruptcy trustee of payments made to the bondholders
either from monies paid to the bond trustee by the company or
from monies drawn by the bond trustee under the letter of
credit. The required opinion must state that, in the event of
bankruptcy of the company or the issuer, the bondholders would
not be subject to a loss of any principal or interest because of a
other rating agencies whose systems of ratings for municipal bonds are used
throughout the country are Fitch Investors Service and White's Ratings.
I" A rating is a current assessment of the credit-worthiness of an obligor (in

the case of an IDB secured by a letter of credit, the bank) with respect to a
specific debt obligation. The bond rating is not a recommendation to purchase,
sell or hold a security, inasmuch as it does not comment upon market price or
suitability of the security for a particular investor. Ratings range from AAA
(Standard & Poor's) or Aaa (Moody's), the highest rating, which indicates that the
capacity of the obligor to pay interest and repay principal is extremely strong and

that the investment is judged to be the best quality, to CC (Standard &Poor's) or
Ca (Moody's), a low rating, which indicates that the obligations are highly
speculative. Ratings of C (Standard & Poor's) and D (Moody's) are assigned to

obligations on which no interest is being paid.
Bonds that are rated in the four highest categories-AAA, AA, A and BBB
(Standard & Poor's) or Aaa, Aa, A and Bbb (Moody's)-are generally recognized
as "investment grade," and securities rated below BBB are generally considered
speculative. The term "investment grade" was originally used by various
regulatory bodies to connote obligations eligible for investment by various

regulated institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and savings and loan

associations. Over time, this term has gained widespread usage throughout the investment community. See R. LAMB & S. RAPPAPORT, MuNICIPAL BONDS (1980).
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claim that payments to them constituted a voidable preference
under the Code.165
In order to render this opinion, at least four methods have
been devised in structuring IDB financings to immunize bondholders from preference claims. These methods, each of which
entails the use of a letter of credit, are referred to as (1) the
multiple draw method; (2) the 91-day prepayment method; (3) the
"I In addition to an opinion dealing with voidable preferences under the
Code, the rating agencies have also required that counsel's opinion address the
possible application of Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank of Tampa (In re Twist
Cap, Inc.), 1 Bankr. 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1979) to the financing being rated. In
Twist Cap, a bank had issued several letters of credit on the debtor's behalf that
were payable to two unsecured creditors of the debtor. To secure its rights to
reimbursement from the debtor for any sums that it might be required to pay
under the letters of credit, the bank obtained a security interest in substantially
all of the debtor's assets. The debtor filed for relief under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act and immediately sought to enjoin the bank from honoring the letters of credit. The bankruptcy court issued a temporary restraining order against
the bank on the grounds that the effect of the bank's honoring of the letters of
credit would be to convert the unsecured claims of the beneficiaries of the letter
of credit into a secured claim of the bank. To allow the unsecured creditor to
receive payment on their prepetition claims, the court stated, would amount to
"an impermissible preferential treatment of them" and would be "counterproductive to the debtor's efforts to obtain rehabilitation. Id. at 285. But see Page v.
First Nat'l Bank of Maryland (In re Page), 18 Bankr. 713 (D.D.C. 1982) (district
court vacated bankruptcy court's order enjoining beneficiary from cashing letter
of credit even though bank that issued letter had lien upon substantial assets of
Chapter 11 debtor to secure bank's reimbursement rights). For an analysis of
stand-by letter of credit in the wake of the Twist Cap decision, see Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 130 (1982).
The likelihood, however remote, of a court issuing a temporary restraining
order that would delay payments to bondholders is seriously considered by the
rating agencies in its analysis of IDB issues. Unless the agencies cay rely on an
opinion of counsel that the bankruptcy trustee would have nothing to gain by enjoining or restraining draws under the letter of credit, they will not assign a
rating on the basis of the bank's credit alone, which is likely to have a significantly negative impact on the rating assigned to the IDBs. See Baron, Debt Supported by Irrevocable Letters of Credit4Irrevocable Commitments and Note Purchase Agreements, Fixed Income Investor, June 21, 1980.
Standard & Poor's Corporation has recently advised that it will base its
analysis on the bank's credit alone where the IDB financing is structured in one of
the following three ways: (1) where neither the bondholders nor the bank are
secured by assets of either the comphny or any other party to the financing; (2)
where both the bondholders and the bank are secured by the same collateral
(Standard & Poor's will not want to undertake comparing the values of different
collateral); or (3) the bondholders are secured, but the bank is unsecured. In addition, the bank must waive all legal or contractual rights to setoff against balances
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reserve fund method; and (4) the stand-by letter of credit
method."' The paragraphs that follow will discuss and analyze
each of these proposed methods and will assess the extent of actual protection afforded.
B.

Analysis of Methods to Avoid Preference Attack

By structuring an IDB financing imaginatively, the threat of
a successful preference attack in the event of the bankruptcy of
the company or the issuer may be substantially reduced, if not
altogether eliminated. In doing so, counsel should endeavor to

remove the possibility of occurrence in the financing of one or
more of the elements of a preference. It should be emphasized

that none of the methods described below has been tested in the
courts and therefore legal opinions as to their efficacy necessarily
should be qualified as the reasoned opinion of counsel.
1. Multiple Draw Method. A method now employed in
some IDB financings to mollify the preference concerns of rating
agencies entails the use of a "live letter of credit." Under this
of the company or any other party to the financing. See Baron, Bank-Supported
Debt, Credit Week, January 25, 1982.
I" The term of the letter of credit may be coextensive with the term of the
IDBs, as is generally the case when the multiple draw method is used. In other
situations, the letter of credit may remain in effect for only a portion of the term
of the IDB issue. For example, an IDB issue maturing in 20 years may have a letter of credit securing payment of principal and interest only for the first 5 years
of the issue, or may extend for an initial term of 1 year from the date of issuance
of the IDBs with options in the bank or the company to renew the letter of credit
annually for additional one-year terms.
The rating on the IDBs based on the letter of credit applies only during the
period that the letter of credit is in effect. Depending on the specific financing,
the various participants (including the rating agencies, the underwriter, and when
there is a limited number of sophisticated investors, those investors) will require
that the IDB documentation provide for the occurrence of certain events if the
letter of credit expires or is terminated prior to full payment of the IDBs. The
IDB documents may provide, for example, that the interest rate on the IDBs will
increase automatically in accordance with some predetermined formula to reflect
the incrased risk. Moreover, the bondholders may be given the option to sell the
IDBs to other purchasers located by the company or to require the company to
purchase the IDBs from them.
A question might be raised whether the transfer of the company's funds to
purchase IDBs that are put to it by the bondholders at the time of the expiration
of the letter of credit could be invalidated under § 547. It seems reasonable to conclude that the payment constitutes a contemporaneous exchange for new value
that is excluded from preference concerns, § 547(c)(1)(A)-(B) (Supp. mI 1979),
rather than a transfer on account of an antecedent debt. By payment of the pur-
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method, the bond trustee is authorized and directed to draw on
the bank issuing the letter of credit at the time each installment
on the IDBs becomes due and in the amount of each such installment payment. The bank, in turn, looks to the company to reimburse it for the amount of each installment draw-down under the
letter of credit. In effect, therefore, it is the bank that, for a fee,
assumes the risk of nonpayment by the company and of later
preference attack should either the company or the issuer become
a debtor in bankruptcy. 61 7 This method seeks to insulate the bondholders from the second element of a preference. It is based on
the premise that the transfer to them of monies drawn under
the letter of credit is not "property of the debtor," but rather is
property of the bank.
It would appear that this method is soundly reasoned and
should effectively protect the bondholders from section 547
avoidance actions to recover payments to them under the letter
of credit. The reasoning adopted by the bankruptcy court in Sun
Railings,Inc. v. Silverman (In re Sun Railings,Inc.)"'8 lends support to this conclusion. There the debtor owed a judgment creditor $88,000. As a partial payment to the creditor, the debtor
borrowed $40,000 from a third party, who issued directly to the
creditor a check earmarked for payment of the debtor's obligachase price, the company acquires the IDB, becomes a bondholder and is vested
with the same rights as other bondholders. The payment by the company is not
made on account of any debt that it owes under the financing agreement, nor does
the payment extinguish the debt of the issuer under the IDB purchased by the company. The acquisition by the company of IDBs issued on its behalf is contemplated
by I.R.C. § 103(b)(9) (1981), which provides that interest income on an IDB during
any period that the IDB is held by the company is not exempt from federal taxation.
Despite the fact that a short-term letter of credit does not cover the IDBs to
maturity, it may be extremely useful in several circumstances. For example, it
may be used to secure payments of the IDBs during the construction or start-up
period, when risk of failure of the project is greatest. It may also be used in a
situation where the company needs to generate capital immediately, but existing
interest rates on IDBs without enhanced security would be prohibitive. In this
latter case, the company has use of the capital for a specified period, during
which, if the bond market does not improve and the interest rate that will take effect upon the expiration of the letter of credit is still prohibitively high, it can attempt to obtain alternate financing. When the company has the discretion to
terminate the letter of credit and thereby trigger a long-term interest rate, the
company may take advantage of improved market conditions as soon as they occur.
"8 See Miller v. Fisk Tire Co., 11 F.2d 301 (D. Minn. 1926).
'
5 Bankr. 538 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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tion. Concluding that the payment to the creditor was not a
transfer of "property of the debtor," the court observed:
When a third party loans [sic] money to a debtor for the
specified purpose of repaying a designated debt, the money
never becomes part of the estate available for distribution to all
creditors and, therefore, no preference is created. .

.

. [The

transaction here involved] is nothing more than the substitution
of one creditor for another and did not diminish the estate available to the creditors. 69
If the company's estate has been depleted preferentially under
the multiple draw method, the depletion can be traced to the
transfer of funds by the company to the bank as reimbursement
for the bank's payment to the bondholders.7
..Id. at 539. Accord In re Henry C. Reusch & Co., Inc., 44 F. Supp. 677
(D.N.J. 1942); Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 18 F. Supp. 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1937), affd, 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938). See also National Bank v. National
Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178 (1912) (payment of bankrupt's debt by endorser on his obligation is not preferential); Huddleston v. Chestnut (In re
Rector), 14 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (funds that debtor's former husband was required to pay into court registry to pay court reporter fees and debtor's attorney fees in divorce proceeding were not voidable because funds were
not property of the debtor and were earmarked for specific purpose).
In Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), the court
emphasized the importance that the third-party loan be made for the specified
purpose of repaying a designated debt. Finding that the debtor's payment of the
creditor's debt by a third-party loan was preferential under the facts there
presented, the court observed: [T]here is nothing in the record to indicate that
the [third party] intended that its loan would be used to pay the [creditor's] note,
or for that matter that it knew of the existence of any such note. 221 F.2d at 393
(emphasis added).
1,0 It is conceivable that a bankruptcy trustee might contend that draws
under the live letter of credit are in effect loans to the company, the proceeds of
which the company disburses to the bond trustee, resulting in a diminution of the
company's estate. Such a contention would be similar to that urged upon but rejected by the court in Hoffer v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 294 F. Supp. 187
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). There a bank creditor was confronted with a corporate debtor
which was suspected to be insolvent. The bank arranged to make a loan to the
debtor's president, who had guaranteed the debtor's obligations to the bank, in
precisely the amount owed by the debtor. The debtor's president, in accordance
with its agreement with the bank, in turn lent the money to the debtor and
simultaneously caused the debtor to satisfy its obligations to the bank. As a
result, the president substituted himself as the principal debtor to the bank in
place of the corporation. When the corporation later filed bankruptcy, the
bankruptcy trustee sought to recover the payment to the bank as a preference.
Rejecting the trustee's assertion that there had been a depletion of the corporate
debtor's estate in the amount of the payment, the court emphasized that the loan
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The employment of a live letter of credit is currently preferred
by the rating agencies. Because all payments to bondholders are
made from draws by the bond trustee on the letter of credit, the
sole issue involved is whether such draws could be recovered as
preferences in the event either the company or the issuer becomes a debtor in bankruptcy. As the discussion above indicates, it is arguable that no such recovery could occur.
From the perspective of the company, however, this method
is less desirable primarily because of the cost associated with it.
The multiple draw technique is cost effective only if the interest
savings that result from its use exceed the bank's fee for the letter of credit itself. The costs associated with this type of letter
of credit are typically high, primarily because preference risks
are shifted to the bank. The bank must also handle the administrative responsibilities of paying draws to the bond trustee and
of recovering reimbursement from the obligor company. In some
cases the additional cost is high enough to offset the benefits,
and deters the company from agreeing to the method.
2. 91-Day Prepayment Method. A second method
sometimes used in IDB financings is the so-called 91-day prepayment, which entails the use of a stand-by letter of credit."'
Following this approach, the company is obligated to pay the
from the bank to the president never would have been made except for the president's agreement to cause the corporate debtor's obligations to be satisfied. The
effect of the transaction, the court reasoned, was the same as if the president as
guarantor had taken up the corporation's note, as he was obligated to do in the
event of a default, and thereby become subrogated to the bank's rights against
the corporation.
Under the multiple draw method described in the text, the bank's role is
closely analogous to that of the guarantor in Hoffer. No depletion from the company's estate results until the company repays the bank for draws under the letter
of credit.
1I Although the terms of a letter of credit will vary depending on the
specific financing, the letter of credit will generally fall into one of two
categories-the live letter of credit or the stand-by letter of credit. In both cases,
draws under the letter of credit are available to the bond trustee to make
payments when due on the IDBs. The difference is that the bond trustee draws on
a live letter of credit each time a payment is due to bondholders. The bank is then
reimbursed by the company. With certain narrow exceptions, no payment is made
to bondholders from funds other than those drawn on the letter of credit. See supra

notes 167-70 and accompanying text. The stand-by letter of credit is only drawn
upon when the company has not deposited sufficient funds with the bond trustee
to pay fully an installment of principal and interest then due, or in other words,
when the company has defaulted under the financing agreement.
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bond trustee each installment payment called for under the
financing agreement at least 91 days before the maturity date of
the installment. The bond trustee holds the prepayment in an
interest-bearing trust account for the 91-day period. If no
bankruptcy case is commenced by or against the company during the period, the bond trustee disburses the monies to the
bondholders. The stand-by letter of credit is called upon in the
event that the company becomes a debtor in a bankruptcy case
prior to the expiration of the 91-day prepayment period or, if for
reasons other than bankruptcy, the company fails to make a payment of principal or interest when due to the bondholders.
To illustrate the operation of this method, assume that or
January 1 the company while insolvent prepays a $50,000
quarterly installment of interest that matures on April 15. On
January 15 the bond trustee disburses to the bondholders a
$50,000 quarterly installment of interest which matured on that
date but which was prepaid by the company on October 1 of the
preceding year. Within 90 days after the January 1 prepayment
and prior to the April 15 date on which the bond trustee is
scheduled to disburse the funds to the bondholders, the company files a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 of the Code.
Although the January 15 disbursement to the bondholders
occurred within 90 days of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee
would be unable to recover that payment because it was transferred to the bond trustee on October 1 of the previous year,
and therefore would not be a transfer of company property
made on or within 90 days of the date of the filing of the petition. With respect to the January I prepayment, the bankruptcy
trustee could recover the $50,000 in the hands of the bond
trustee if each of the seven elements under section 547 are
satisfied. However, as the result of the company's bankruptcy,
the bond trustee would be authorized under the indenture to accelerate payment of the unpaid balance of the IDBs," could
17

A provision in an executory contract that permits any modification or

termination of a right or obligation under the contract upon the commencement of
a bankruptcy case is referred to as an "ipso facto" clause, see H.R. REP. No.
95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 348-49, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6304-05, and is generally unenforceable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(3)
(Supp. 11 1979).
To the extent that a provision authorizing acceleraton of payments due
under a contract upon the bankruptcy of the obligor is deemed to be an ipso facto
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draw down that amount under the letter of credit to pay the
bondholders' claims in full, and could turn over the $50,000 in its
hands to the bankruptcy trustee. The bondholders, therefore,
would be protected and their claims fully satisfied.
This method seeks to overcome potential preference problems by removing the sixth element of a preference. As previously discussed, a transfer is vulnerable under section 547 if
made on or within 90 days before the date of the transferor's
bankruptcy. By causing the payment to be made at least 91 days
before the maturity date of the installment due on the IDBs and
the disbursement of the payment to the bondholders, it is hoped
that a bankruptcy trustee would be unsuccessful in any attempt
to recover such disbursements as preferences from the bondholders. If this method is relied upon, extreme care should be
taken in computing the 91-day period to ensure that the 90-day
period of avoidance has actually run before the bond trustee
disburses the money to the bondholders. Otherwise, the essence
of the method is lost. In computing the 90-day period under section 547, most courts appear to exclude the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition and to include the date of the transfer."'
The 91-day prepayment method has been accepted by the
rating agencies as providing sufficient protection from preference claims against bondholders."" A primary shortcoming from
clause, such a provision might be held unenforceable in bankruptcy. See
American See. Bank v. Robins Un re Horton), 15 Bankr. 403 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981)
(holding that such an acceleration clause was unenforceable). In the illustration
contained in the text, it is the IDBs that are being accelerated under the indenture and not the payments called for under the financing agreement by the company. However, because the financing agreement requires the company to pay to
the issuer or its assignee amounts necessary for payment of the IDBs, the acceleration of payment of the IDBs has the effect of accelerating the payments
under the financing agreement. Whether or not a bankruptcy court read into the
financing agreement the ipso facto provisions of the indenture would appear to be
inconsequential as far as payments under the letter of credit are concerned.
I" FED. R. BANxR.P. 906(a). See also Sid Kumines, Inc. v. Wolf (In re Wolf),
13 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); Grimaldi v. John A. Ruell, Inc. (In re
Grimaldi), 3 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); Roper v. Mardeman (In re B&M
Contractors, Inc.), 2 Bankr. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1979) (decided under former
Act).
1 See Baron, Bank-Supported Debt, Credit Week, January 25, 1982; Baron,
Debt Supported by Irrevocable Letters of Credit, Irrevocable Commitments and
Note Purchase Agreements, Fixed Income Investor, June 21, 1980.
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the company's perspective is the cash flow consideration in
generating funds for deposit with the bond trustee in advance of
the date on which those monies are actually due to the bondholders. The potential hardship on the company is mitigated,
however, in two respects.
First, interest on IDBs is often payable semiannually, for example on June 1 and December 1 of each year. Although the
company will be required to make its first interest payment on
March 1 rather than June 1 in the first year, thereafter the
period between interest payments will be six months (March 1
and September 1), thereby eliminating the impact of the 91-day
prepayment.
Second, the financing agreement and indenture provide that
during the period the funds are on deposit with the bond
trustee, the company may direct and benefit from the investment of those funds. Interest earned on those investments
should be equal to or at least approach the amount of interest
earnings on the funds had they been otherwise invested by the
company.
3. Reserve Fund Method. A third method of obviating the
risk that payments to bondholders will constitute a voidable preference involves application of a combination of the theories
described above. This so-called reserve fund method, which is
also used in conjunction with a stand-by letter of credit,"'
eliminates the burden on the company to make payments of
principal and interest 91 days in advance of the due date for
those payments. Using this method, a portion of the proceeds
derived from the IDB issue are withheld and deposited into a
reserve fund maintained by the bond trustee. The proceeds thus
withheld and deposited into the fund are in an amount sufficient
to pay the largest single principal and interest payment that
will become due during the term of the letter of credit."' The
bond trustee is instructed to hold those proceeds in trust and to
use them only for one of the following purposes:
(1)

To reimburse the bondholders if they are required
by the bankruptcy trustee to return any principal

, See supra note 171.
If interest payments are paid semiannually, then only one payment would
be vulnerable to a preference claim at any given time.
178
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or interest payment because the payment is found
to be preferential under section 547;
(2) To comply with an order of a bankruptcy court
respecting disposition of the trust funds; or
(3) To use the monies to pay the next installment of
principal and interest on the IDBs after a period of
at least 91 days following the expiration of the letter
of credit, as long as during the 91-day period there
occurred no bankruptcy of the issuer or the company.
Upon the occurrence of an event of default under the indenture, whether as the result of bankruptcy or some other triggering event, the bond trustee is authorized by the indenture to accelerate the payment of the balance due on the IDBs and is
directed to draw on the letter of credit in an amount sufficient
to satisfy such balance.
To illustrate this method, assume that from the total proceeds of an IDB issue in the original principal amount of
$5,300,000, there is deposited in the reserve fund the sum of
$300,000, which represents the largest installment of interest
and principal that will become due during the term of the standby letter of credit. Assume further that on May 1 the company
pays to the bond trustee, and the bond trustee disburses to the
bondholders, an interest payment of $300,000 and that 85 days
thereafter the company files for Chapter 7 relief. The bond
trustee would be authorized under the indenture to accelerate
payment of the balance due on the IDBs, could draw down that
amount under the letter of credit to satisfy in full the bondholders' claims and could hold the reserve fund to reimburse the
bondholders in the event the bankruptcy trustee successfully
avoided the company's May 1 payment to them.as a preference.'
1n The indenture should direct the bond trustee to hold the reserve fund until the expiration of the statutory limitation period for preference actions under §
547. See supra note 57-60 and accompanying text. While the fund is intended to
reimburse the bondholders in the event they are required to return any prebankrupty payments received by them, it might effectively be used by the bond
trustee as a substitute for recovery from the bondholders in exchange for a
release by the bankruptcy trustee of all avoidance claims he might have against
either the bondholders or the bond trustee. Furthermore, if authorized by the indenture, the bond trustee might utilize the reserve fund monies to settle all of the
claims of petitioning creditors in an involuntary case (to obviate the entry of an
order for relief) or to purchase the claims of the debtor's other creditors (to
foreclose application of the seventh element of a preference). See In re Nina Merchandise Corp., 5 Bankr. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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This method addresses the second element of a preference
and is based on the theory that the reserve fund monies would
not be "property of the debtor" within the meaning of section
547 since they are immediately and irrevocably deposited with
the bond trustee solely for the applications set forth above. The
IDB proceeds, it can be argued, represent property of the issuer
in consideration of the issuer's sale of the IDBs. Because the
issuer never makes proceeds placed in the reserve fund available to the company for acquisition or construction of the pro17
ject, those proceeds never become property of the company.
On the other hand, the company is required to repay the full
amount of principal and interest on the IDBs under the financing
agreement, including that portion withheld for the reserve fund.
Moreover, the company will benefit from the application of the
reserve fund to pay installments of principal and interest on the
9
IDBs after 90 days following expiration of the letter of credit."
Thus a bankruptcy trustee might assert that the company's entitlement to those reserved proceeds renders them property of
the company. Regardless of whether the reserve fund monies
are property of the issuer or the company, as long as at least 91
days elapse from the date of the deposit to the reserve fund
without either the issuer or the company becoming a debtor in
bankruptcy, the transfers to the reserve fund will be immune
from avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee. Even if the deposit
to the reserve fund is found to be a voidable transfer of the company's property in a bankruptcy case initiated within 90 days of
the deposit, the bondholders are protected by virtue of the letter of credit standing behind the company's obligations.
" See Huddleston v. Chestnut (In re Rector), 14 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1981) (funds which debtor's former husband was required by divorce decree
to pay into court to satisfy debtor's attorney fees were not recoverable under § 547
because funds were never subject to debtor's control or disposition and were earmarked for specific purpose).
17 The indenture usually provides that if no bankruptcy of the issuer or the
company has occurred through the period ending not less than 90 days after the
expiration of the letter of credit, the bond trustee is instructed to apply amounts
in the reserve fund to the payment of principal and interest on the IDBs. This
application of the reserve fund monies benefits the company by reducing its
obligations under the financing agreement.
If the term of the letter of credit and the IDBs is coextensive, then the
reserve fund is held until the IDBs have been fully paid. The indenture ordinarily
provides that any amounts remaining in the reserve fund after payment of the
IDBs is to be returned to the company.
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If a bankruptcy case is not commenced on or within 90 days
of the deposit to the reserve fund, then, as noted above, the
question of whether the deposit constituted a transfer of property of the company will not arise. There are, however, equally important questons. One is whether a bankruptcy trustee would be
able to compel a turnover of the reserve fund monies in the
hands of the bond trustee."' The second is whether any
disbursements made from the reserved fund to bondholders
within the 90-day period before bankruptcy could be recovered
as preferences. In an analagous situation, the court in In re National Public Service Corp.,"' a pre-Code case, found that the
bankruptcy trustee could not recover money in a similar fund.
There the bankruptcy trustee sought to recover from an indenture trustee for debenture holders certain funds paid to the indenture trustee by the bankrupt issuer to meet the coupon interest that became due semiannually. The funds were still in the
indenture trustee's hands on the date of bankruptcy because the
coupons representing the sums sought to be recovered had not
yet been presented for payment. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy referee's order denying recovery to the bankrupty
trustee on the grounds that the funds deposited with the indenture trustee were held in trust for the debenture holders and
1" Section 542 of the Code mandates that an entity which is in possession of
property of the estate must turn over such property or its value to the bankruptcy

Trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (Supp. 11 1979). But see Troy Indus. Catering Serv. v.

Michigan Dep't of Treasury (In re Troy Indus. Catering Serv.), 2 Bankr. 521
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980) (creditor is entitled to hearing before turnover can be
ordered). If the entity transfers such property without actual notice or knowledge
of the bankruptcy case and in good faith, the entity is not liable to the bankruptcy
trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (Supp. III 1979). The transferees, however, may be
liable to the bankruptcy trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (Supp. 1111979); 124 CONG.
REC. H11097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REC. S17413 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1978).
If the entity is a "custodian" within the meaning of § 101(10) of the Code, § 543
enjoins him from making any disposition of property of the debtor, and requires
him to turn over to the bankruptcy trustee, and to account for, any such property
in his possession. 11 U.S.C. § 543(a-(b) (Supp. II 1979). A "custodian" is defined to
include a "trustee ... under a contract, that is appointed or authorized to take
charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such
property, or for the purpose of general administration of such property for the
benefit of the debtor's creditors." 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(C) (Supp. III 1979).
181 3 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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thus did not constitute property
of the bankrupt to which the
182
bankruptcy trustee succeeded.

Equally persuasive is Creel v. Birmingham Trust National
Bank," another a pre-Code bankruptcy case, in which the debtor
corporation deposited approximately $500,000 with a bank to
secure installment payments required by a judgment rendered
in favor of two creditors. In accordance with a settlement agreement incorporated into the state court judgment, the bank
agreed to invest the funds in time deposits (which matured on
the payment dates set forth in the judgment) and to pay those
installments when they became due from the deposited funds.
Thereafter, the debtor assigned to its parent company all of the
debtor's rights in the deposited funds and the parent comipany in
turn agreed to insure that all payments required by the judgment were timely paid. Some three years following the assignment, the parent company was adjudicated a bankrupt. Its
bankruptcy trustee sought to recover the funds remaining in the
bank's possession as property of the bankrupt estate, to recover
those funds transferred immediately prior to bankruptcy as
voidable preferences, and to recover all funds transferred from
the deposit since bankruptcy. Finding that the bank held the
deposited funds in trust for the benefit of the judgment
creditors and that the debtor had irrevocably parted with
possession and control of the funds, the district court ruled that
neither the debtor nor its bankrupt parent had any interest in
the trust funds and that therefore the bankruptcy trustee's
recovery must be denied.
Moreover, the bankruptcy court in Ledford v. Associates
FinancialServices (In re Hayes) found that a debtor's payment
of money into a municipal court's statutory trusteeship for
distribution to her creditors was an irrevocable transfer of such
money by which she relinquished all rights of possession and
control. The court reasoned that the funds held by the
"I Accord Steel Cities Chem. Co. v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 7 F.2d 280
(2d Cir. 1925) (where pursuant to mortgage to secure a bond issue the debtor corporation deposited funds with an indenture trustee to pay bond coupons due on a
specified date, neither the corporation nor its ancillary receivers were entitled to
recover such funds because funds were held in trust).
" 383 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
IC 5 Bankr. 676 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
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trusteeship were in custodia legis, and no longer represented
property of the debtor. Accordingly, the municipal court
trustee's distribution of the funds to creditors within 90 days of
bankruptcy was not a transfer of the debtor's property that was
subject to avoidance under section 547.188 It would seem that the
proceeds in the reserve fund are likewise irrevocably beyond
the possession and control of the company and hence no longer
property of the estate.
If, however, the debtor depositor is at liberty to use the
funds or in fact uses them for purposes other than as stated in
the instructions accompanying the deposit, the bankruptcy court
may conclude that there was no intention to create a trust and
that theiefore the deposited funds are recoverable by the
bankruptcy trustee. For example, in Schloss v. Powell,188 a preCode receivership case, a railroad's deposit of money in a bank,
with instructions to use it to pay maturing coupons presented
by bondholders of the railroad, did not in the court's view evince
an irrevocable intention to impress the money with a trust for
the bondholders' purposes. Likewise, in Clark v. New York
Trust Co. (In re Associated Gas & Electric Co.),' the trustee in
a bankruptcy reorganization case sought to recover funds of the
debtor that had been deposited by it to pay interest when due to
the holders of the debtor's investment certificates. Because the
aebtor reserved the right to a return of the funds at any time
from the paying agent, the court found that the debtor had not
irrevocably parted with control over thern sufficient to create a
trust for the certificate holders.' Furthermore, the court noted
'8 The same result was reached on similar facts in the case of Selby v. Ford
Motor Co., 590 F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1979). In Selby, the bankruptcy trustee of a construction contractor sought to recover as perferences payments made by the
debtor to its subcontractors. Under the applicable state law, all funds paid to a
contractor were considered to be held in trust by the contractor for the benefit of
its subcontractors. The court concluded that the statutory trust funds were not
property of the debtor and denied recovery to the bankruptcy trustee. Although
the case was decided under the former Bankruptcy Act, the court observed that
the same result would be dictated by the current Code, which under § 541(c)(2)
gives effect to a "restriction of the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." Id at 648.
18 93 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1938).
" 137 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1943).
" But see George v. Kitchens By Rice Bros., Inc., 665 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1981)
wherein the court in a case under the former bankruptcy law decided that real
estate placed in trust by the debtor for the benefit of his children was not property of the estate even though the trust was revocable).
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that the debtor had allowed the funds to be intermingled with
other monies held by the paying agent for the debtor and that
such intermingling belied the existence of a trust.
The rating agencies have indicated acceptance of this reserve
fund method as a means of avoiding preference claims against
bondholders. One adverse effect, however, is that it necessitates
that the principal amount of the IDBs issued must be larger in
order to provide for the reserve fund. However, as previously
noted though in connection with the 91-day prepayment method,
the funds held in reserve are invested by the bond trustee and
the return on that investment will offset to some extent the increased interest costs necessitated by the additional principal
added to the IDB issue. A second adverse consequence for the
company is that the increased amount of debt may require increased equity investments in order for the company to attain a
'
desirable or required debt-to-equity ratio. 89
4. Stand-by Letter of Credit Method. A fourth method is
similar to the two just discussed, but eliminates the necessity
for both the 91-day prepayment by the company and the establishment of a reserve fund. This method involves a stand-by letter
of credit, the term of which extends at least 91 days beyond the
date of payment of the final installment of principal and interest
that it secures. The letter of credit provides that in the event of
bankruptcy by the company, the bond trustee may draw on the
letter of credit to the extent of any monies paid to bondholders
during the 90-day period immediately preceding bankruptcy.
The amount so drawn under the letter of credit is deposited in a
separate trust account and may be disbursed only for the following purposes:
(1) To reimburse the bondholders if they are required
by the bankruptcy trustee to return any principal
or interest payment because the payment is found
to be preferential under section 547; or
(2) To comply with an order of a bankruptcy court
respecting the disposition of the trust funds.
Draws under the stand-by letter of credit are also available to
the bond trustee to pay principal and interest due on the IDBs
when there has been a failure by the company to pay such
"' See I.R.C. § 385 (1981) and Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(g).
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amounts, whether the default is the result of bankruptcy or of
some other cause.
To illustrate this method, assume that on January 1 the company while insolvent makes the final installment payment of
principal and interest on an issue of IDBs and that 85 days
following the January 1 payment the company files for relief
under Chapter 7 of the Code. The bond trustee under the indenture would be authorized to draw on the letter of credit in an
amount equal to the January I payment and deposit that amount
in a separate trust fund. In the event the bankruptcy trustee
avoids the January 1 transfer because each of the seven
elements of section 547 is satisfied, the bond trustee could reimburse the bondholders out of the trust fund for amounts
recovered by the bankruptcy trustee.
Under the reasoning set forth in the multiple draw method
described above, this structuring of an IDB transaction clearly
protects the bondholders. Monies paid to the bondholders within
90 days preceding bankruptcy, if recovered by the bankruptcy
trustee, are immediately reimbursed out of the trust funds available from the letter of credit and, therefore, are insulated
against preference claims. The danger that principal or interest
on the IDBs will go unpaid because of a preference claim is effectively eliminated.
The rating agencies have accepted this method as readily as
they have the 91-day prepayment method.19 Use of the stand-by
letter of credit narrows the preference issue to whether draws
under the letter are voidable by a bankruptcy trustee in the
event of a bankruptcy of the company. As the discussion under
the multiple draw method indicates, no such preference attack
should succeed because no property of the company is involved.
From the company's perspective, this method may be most
favorable. It eliminates the problems associated with the other
three methods in that there is no early payment requirement, no
need to increase the size of the IDB issue, and it is not as expensive as the live letter of credit.
Because it can reasonably be concluded that each of the four
methods discussed above would result in the bondholders being
protected from a preference claim in the event of bankruptcy,
the method used in any given IDB financing must be determined
. See Baron, Bank-SupportedDebt, Credit Week, January 25, 1982.
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by the company on a case by case basis in light of its current
needs and circumstances, including the availability and cost of
the letter of credit, the company's cash flow, and its debt-toequity requirements.
V.

CONCLUSION

In light of today's economic conditions, IDBs provide a costeffective means of generating funds to finance capital improvements. With the increased use of IDBs as a financing technique,
investor concerns will also increase over the possible implications of bankruptcy. In the unlikely occurrence of an issuer
bankruptcy, the preference concerns of bondholders arguably are
minimal. On the other hand, bondholders justifiably should be
concerned with the creditworthiness of the company for whose
benefit the IDBs are issued. The bankruptcy of the company
could have a substantially adverse effect on the bondholders'
ability to retain payments to them within the 90-day period
preceding the bankruptcy case. If the bondholders are fully
secured creditors because the value of the mortgaged project
exceeds the amount of IDBs outstanding, the potential for successful preference claims against the bondholders in the event
of a company bankruptcy is diminished. Where the security is
insufficient in value and the bondholders are only partially
secured, payments by the company to the bondholders during
the preference period are more vulnerable to avoidance under
section 547.
It is forseeable that security enhancement devices, such as
the letter of credit, will be used more often as a technique to
achieve greater market access and to lower interest costs. Innovative methods of avoiding preference claims against bondholders in IDB financings through the employment of letters of
credit will continue to be developed and perfected.
The four methods set forth and discussed in this article appear to be based on sound preference analyses and should effectively accomplish the intended goal of bondholder protection. On
the basis of existing interpretations of the preference laws, the
multiple draw and stand-by letter of credit methods should be
the least susceptible to a successful preference challenge and,
consequently, should provide the maximum protection to the
bondholders against preference claims.
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